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COMPLETE LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN DISTRICT COURT
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company ("St. Paul") was one of the
plaintiffs in this action. The District Court awarded summary judgment in Defendant
American Casualty Company of Reading, PA's ("American Casualty") favor in
connection with all plaintiffs' claims, including those of St. Paul. Both St. Paul and
the University filed notices of appeal of that judgment entered in American Casualty's
favor. However, on July 21, 2003, this Court entered its order dismissing St. Paul's
appeal pursuant to a stipulation permitting St. Paul to withdraw its appeal.
Accordingly, St. Paul is no longer a party to this appeal.
St. Paul also named Nurse Troy Alan Broka ("Nurse Broka") as a defendant in
this case. However, American Casualty understands that St. Paul never served Nurse
Broka with its complaint, and Nurse Broka was not involved as a party in the District
Court proceedings.
PRO HAC VICE ADMISSION
Alec M. Barinholtz and Jennifer Mathis of Ross, Dixon & Bell, L.L.P. in Irvine,
California, were admitted pro hac vice in connection with this case pursuant to the
District Court's Order dated February 6, 2002. [R. 74-75, 81-82, Addendum C].
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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal because it is an appeal from a final
order or judgment entered by the trial court. Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a).
The trial court entered judgment in American Casualty's favor on December 30, 2002.
After the plaintiffs filed notices of appeal, the Utah Supreme Court, on March 24,
2003, assigned this appeal to the Court of Appeals.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Whether the University can reallocate to and recover from American Casualty
any portion of the University's settlement of a claim asserted against the University
only, where the sole person insured by American Casualty in this instance - Nurse
Broka - was not a party to that settled matter, had no claim or suit brought against him
in that matter, and incurred no legal obligation to pay any amounts to anyone in
connection with the settlement?
Whether the University can circumvent the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
by recovering from Nurse Broka's personal professional liability insurer, American
Casualty, amounts that the University was statutorily obligated to pay, and for which it
is statutorily prohibited from recovering directly from Nurse Broka?
An appeal from an award of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness.
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co.. 2002 UT 69, fflll7-21, 54 P.3d 1054, 10601061; Brown v. Weis. 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
The issues were preserved below at R. 156-183.
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III.

DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1,
et seq. The pertinent provisions of the Act that are determinative in this matter are as
follows:1 § 63-30-3 (1991, amended 2003); § 63-30-4 (1991, amended 2002); § 6330-28 (1991); § 63-30-36 (1991, amended 2002); § 63-30-37 (1987); § 63-30-38
(1983).
IV.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS,
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW

This case is a dispute over who should pay for the University's decision to
settle a claim asserted only against the University by the widow of a patient who died
while in the care of the University Hospital: the University, against whom the widow
made and settled her claims, or the personal professional liability insurer of one of the
nurses involved in the patient's care, against whom the widow did not make a specific
claim, demand, or bring suit, and who incurred no legal obligations to contribute to the
University's settlement or pay any other amounts.
On approximately December 22, 1998, the University of Utah Hospital and the
University of Utah (collectively, the "University") filed an action against "Continental

1

The full text of the current versions of these statutory provisions is included in
Addendum A. Although certain of these provisions were amended subsequent to the
time period that is at issue in this case, none of those amendments are relevant to the
issues presented in this case.
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Casualty dba CNA Insurance Companies." In its complaint, the University sought to
recover the $1 million it paid under its Self-Insurance Trust to settle a claim made
against it by Susan Hepworth, the widow of Abel Hepworth, who died while a patient
at the University Hospital. The University's complaint alleges that the entire
settlement was paid as a result of a medical incident arising out of the care rendered by
American Casualty's insured, Troy Broka, who was a nurse employed at the
University Hospital at the time of the incident. The University's complaint purports to
state causes of action for (1) subrogation - breach of duty to defend; and (2) equitable
subrogation.
On or about October 18, 1999, St. Paul, the University's insurer, filed a
complaint against Nurse Broka and American Casualty based on factual allegations
essentially identical to those in the University's complaint. St. Paul's complaint
purported to state causes of action against American Casualty for (1) subrogation breach of duty to defend; (2) equitable subrogation; and (3) contribution. St. Paul also
purported to state a cause of action against Nurse Broka for subrogation, although
American Casualty understands and believes that St. Paul never served Nurse Broka
with its complaint. As damages, St. Paul (as the insurer for the University and all
University employees, including Nurse Broka), sought from American Casualty the
Continental Casualty Company is not the insurer that issued the policy to Nurse
Broka, and CNA Insurance Companies is not a legally cognizable entity. Accordingly,
the parties in this consolidated action stipulated to substitute American Casualty as the
proper defendant.
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$323,523 St. Paul contributed to the settlement of the Hepworth matter. On May 15,
2001, the District Court ordered that both the University's case and St. Paul's case
against American Casualty be consolidated.
The University moved for summary judgment on February 26, 2002. St. Paul
joined in that motion. American Casualty moved for summary judgment against the
University and St. Paul on March 1, 2002. The District Court held oral argument on
all parties' motions for summary judgment on September 6, 2002.
On October 7, 2002, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision
granting summary judgment in American Casualty's favor and denying the
University's and St. Paul's motions for summary judgment. On December 30, 2002,
the District Court entered judgment in American Casualty's favor as to all of the
University's and St. Paul's claims against American Casualty. (The District Court's
Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Addendum H).
The University and St. Paul filed timely notices of appeal and each filed an
opening brief. On July 21, 2003, this Court entered its order permitting St. Paul to
voluntarily dismiss its appeal. [Order attached as Addendum I]. Accordingly, this
appeal is proceeding only as to the University and American Casualty.
B.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Claim Against the University

Nurse Troy Broka was a University Hospital employee from January 1, 1997
until the end of April 1997. [R. 299 at % 2, Addendum G]. While Nurse Broka was
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employed at the University Hospital, he was one of the nurses who cared for Abel
Hepworth, a neurological patient at the University Hospital in April 1997. [R. 3 at If 9,
Addendum B]. According to the University's complaint in this action, on or about
April 10, 1997, Nurse Broka negligently administered excess intravenous fluids to Mr.
Hepworth, allegedly causing or contributing to Mr. Hepworth's death four days later.
[R. 3 atffij10-11, Addendum B]. The University acknowledges that Nurse Broka was
acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his alleged
negligent conduct, and has never alleged or asserted to the contrary. [R. 94 at f 3].
Soon after Mr. Hepworth died, his widow, on her own behalf and on behalf of
her two minor children, advised the University Hospital that she would be
commencing a lawsuit against the University. [R. 3 at f 12, Addendum B]. There is
no evidence Mrs. Hepworth ever made any demand directly on Nurse Broka. Indeed,
as stated in Nurse Broka's affidavit filed with the District Court in support of
American Casualty's Motion for Summary Judgment, Nurse Broka never received
notice that anyone, including the Hepworths, intended to pursue him in connection
with Mr. Hepworth's death.3 [R. 299 atfflf4-5, Addendum G].

3

In opposing American Casualty's summary judgment motion in the District
Court, the University submitted an affidavit of its risk manager, Lynda Faldmo, who
asserted that Mrs. Hepworth "referred" to Nurse Broka's alleged negligence in her
discussions with the University. [R. 109, Addendum D]. Putting aside the hearsay
problems with this affidavit, it remains undisputed that, although Mrs. Hepworth may
have believed that her husband's death was caused in part by Nurse Broka's alleged
negligence, she only made a demand on the University and not on Nurse Broka.
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The University and its insurer, St. Paul, began immediate settlement
negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth. While engaged in those negotiations, the University
wrote to Nurse Broka's personal professional liability insurer, American Casualty,
requesting that American Casualty participate in the settlement of the Hepworth matter
[R. 3 at Tf 14, Addendum B]. On July 17, 1997, American Casualty responded, stating
in part that, "Mr. Broka is an employee of the University of Utah Health Sciences
Center and as such should be defended under their policy. We respectfully decline to
participate in the settlement of this matter." [R. 292, Addendum F]. American
Casualty also advised the University that American Casualty's obligations, if any,
would be excess, at best. Id.
The University, on behalf of itself and all of its employees, eventually reached a
settlement with Mrs. Hepworth on or about March 31, 1998. [R. 4, Addendum B].
According to the settlement agreement,4 the Hepworths settled their potential wrongful
death suit with the University for a total of $ 1,323,523. The University paid $ 1
million out of its Self-Insurance Trust and St. Paul paid $323,523 of the $5 million
policy it issued to the University. [R. 4 atfflj19-20, Addendum B]. Nurse Broka was

4

Apart from the parties, the amounts paid, and the general scope of the releases,
the settlement agreement itself was not part of the record in the District Court because
it contains a confidentiality provision. If the Court would like to review the
agreement, American Casualty will submit it for the Court's in camera review, if the
University has no objection.
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not a party to the settlement and is nowhere specifically mentioned by name in the
settlement agreement.
On April 23, 1998, counsel for the University again wrote to American
Casualty, advising that it had settled the matter and that it intended to seek recovery of
the settlement amount from American Casualty. [R. 293-294]. American Casualty
continued to decline to contribute to the University's settlement with the Hepworths.
2.

The Lawsuits Against American Casualty

On approximately December 22, 1998, the University filed this action, seeking
to recover the $1 million that it paid under its Self-Insurance Trust to settle the
Hepworth matter. [R. 1-6, Addendum B]. The complaint alleges that the entire
settlement paid to the Hepworths was paid as a result of a medical incident arising out
of the care rendered by Nurse Broka. [R. 5 at ^ 27, Addendum B]. The University
purports to state causes of action for (1) subrogation - breach of duty to defend,
alleging that American Casualty breached its duty to defend Nurse Broka, resulting in
the University incurring attorneys fees and costs of $8,459.20 (despite the fact that the
Hepworths never made any specific demands for money or services against Nurse
Broka and Nurse Broka never incurred any defense expenses related to that
settlement);5 and (2) equitable subrogation, alleging that American Casualty failed to
pay all amounts for which Nurse Broka became legally obligated to pay as a result of
5

Nurse Broka's affidavit filed in support of American Casualty's summary
judgment motion attests to both of these facts. [R. 299 atffl[4-7, Addendum G].
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injuries caused by a medical incident arising from care provided by Nurse Broka5 in
the amount of $1 million. Id.
St. Paul followed suit. On or about October 18, 1999, St. Paul filed a complaint
against Nurse Broka and American Casualty, based on factual allegations essentially
identical to those in the University's complaint, and purporting to state causes of
action against American Casualty for (1) subrogation - breach of duty to defend; (2)
equitable subrogation; and (3) contribution. [R. 281-288]. St. Paul also purported to
state a cause of action against Nurse Broka for subrogation. As damages, St. Paul
sought the $323,523 it allegedly contributed to the settlement of the Hepworth matter.
[R. 287]. On May 15, 2001, both cases against American Casualty were consolidated.
[R. 45-47].
3.

The Policies

American Casualty issued Professional Nurses Liability Program Policy No. N125381620 to Nurse Broka for the policy period April 22, 1996 to April 22, 1997 (the
"American Casualty Policy"), with a $1 million limit of liability per each "medical
incident," $3 million aggregate. [R. 266, Addendum E]. Subject to all of its terms,
limitations, conditions, exclusions and endorsements, the American Casualty Policy
provides coverage for all amounts that Nurse Broka becomes "legally obligated to pay
as a result of injury or damage caused by a medical incident by [Broka]." [R. 273 at
§ 1(A), Addendum E] (boldface in original). The American Casualty Policy defines
"claim" to mean "the receipt by [Broka] of a demand for money or services naming
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[Broka] and alleging a medical incident." [R. 275 at § IV, Addendum E] (boldface
in original).
The American Casualty Policy was issued to Nurse Broka only. [R. 266,
Addendum E]. There is no coverage available under the American Casualty Policy
for the University or for any of its other employees. Nurse Broka purchased the
American Casualty Policy effective April 22, 1996, before he ever was employed by
the University. Id [See also R. 299 at Tf 2, Addendum G].
The University and its employees, including Nurse Broka, are afforded
coverage by St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company Health Care Facility
Umbrella Excess Liability Policy No. 566UH0042, issued to University of Utah
Health Sciences (including the University of Utah Hospital) for the policy period July
1, 1995 to July 1, 1998 (the "St. Paul Policy"). [R. 185-189]. The St. Paul Policy's
limit of liability is $5 million, excess of the Hospital's $1 million self-insured
retention.6 [R. 200-201]. The St. Paul Policy provides coverage, in pertinent part, for

6

The University satisfied its $1 million retention under the St. Paul Policy
through a Self-Insurance Trust that the University has established to cover such
liabilities. [R. 146-151; R. 4 at ^f 9, Addendum B]. The Utah Governmental Immunity
Act specifically provides that a governmental entity may self-insure to meet its
obligations under the Act. See § 63-30-28 (1991) ("Any governmental entity within
the state may purchase commercial insurance, self-insure, or self-insure and purchase
excess commercial insurance in excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against
any risk created or recognized by this chapter or any action for which a governmental
entity or its employee may be held liable .. . [and] may self-insure with respect to
specified classes of claims by establishing a trust account") (Addendum A).
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the Hospital and for its "present and former employees . . . while working . . . within
the scope of their duties." [R. 207].
V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This case arises out of the University's attempt to collect a windfall to which it
is not entitled at the expense of one of its nurse's personal liability insurers, American
Casualty, and at the same time to craft an end-run around the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act (the "Act").
The University's efforts fail for at least two independent reasons.
First, as the District Court correctly held, none of American Casualty's
coverage obligations to Nurse Broka were triggered by the University's settlement
with the Hepworths because "Nurse Broka never had any claims made against him and
never became legally obligated to pay anything to the Hepworths in connection with
the University and St. Paul's settlement of the University's liability to the Hepworths."
[R. 503, Addendum H]. This holding is consistent with the law in the majority of
jurisdictions that recognize when a malpractice claim is asserted only against a
hospital and not against its employees whose alleged negligence caused an injury, the
employee's personal professional liability insurer has no coverage obligations. Not
only was no "claim" made against Nurse Broka within the definition of the American
Casualty Policy (the Hepworth's only demand was against the University), but Nurse
Broka never became legally obligated to pay any amount in connection with the
University's settlement with the Hepworths. The District Court enforced the
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American Casualty Policy as written, and there is no reason to do otherwise in this
case.
Second, as a University employee, Nurse Broka never could have become
legally obligated to pay any amounts in connection with his alleged negligence to Mr.
Hepworth, because the Act insulates him from personal liability and requires that the
University defend and indemnify him. Not only does the Act require the University to
defend and indemnify its employees in connection with negligent acts committed in
the course and scope of their employment, it also forecloses the University from
seeking indemnity for losses suffered through the negligent conduct of those
employees. To further effectuate the legislative intent that the primary obligation to
defend and indemnify government employees shall rest with government employers,
the Utah Supreme Court has held that this obligation cannot be passed off to the
personal liability insurers of the government entity's employees. Gulf Ins. Co. v.
Horace Mann Ins. Co., 567 P.2d 158 (Utah 1977). Despite the clear state of Utah law
in this regard, that is exactly what the University is trying to do here.
The University attempts to avoid the correct result reached by the District Court
by arguing that if coverage is unavailable under American Casualty's Policy for the
University's settlement of the Hepworth matter, coverage under that Policy somehow
is rendered illusory. The University further asserts that when American Casualty
initially denied coverage six years ago, it waived its ability to rely on the clear terms of
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the American Casualty Policy's coverage agreement, and the ability to rely on the
provisions of the Act. Both contentions are without merit.
As for the alleged illusory coverage, the University essentially argues that
personal insurance issued to a Utah government employee is illusory if that insurance
is not available to reimburse a government entity for discharging its statutory
obligation under the Act to defend and indemnify its employees, against whom the
government has no recourse. The flaw in this argument is that not only has it been
effectively rejected by the Utah Supreme Court, but it also ignores that the American
Casualty Policy issued to Nurse Broka did provide professional liability coverage to
him in many circumstances in which he otherwise would not be immune from suit or
entitled to indemnity from the University.
Turning next to the University's waiver argument, the University has not
proven any of the required elements to demonstrate that American Casualty waived
any right under its Policy or Utah law. American Casualty never intentionally
relinquished a known coverage defense, nor did it waive the requirement that the
University prove in the first instance that the underlying matter came within the scope
of the American Casualty Policy's insuring agreement - a burden that Utah law places
on the University or anyone else seeking to establish coverage.
Additionally, the immunities pursuant to the Act are not policy provisions or
exclusions that American Casualty can waive. The University - which is not even
American Casualty's insured - cannot create coverage by estoppel under
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circumstances where coverage is not otherwise available, nor can it use a waiver
argument to bypass its statutory obligations.
In summary, affirming the District Court's judgment will ensure that the
University does not avoid its statutorily-imposed obligations to defend and indemnify
its employees via an attempt to recover from Nurse Broka's personal insurer amounts
that by statute the University cannot recover from Nurse Broka. The University's
settlement with the Hepworths resolved the University's own liability as well as the
liability of all of the other University employees involved in the care and treatment of
Mr. Hepworth, including but not limited to Nurse Broka. Although the University
contends that in settling, it shouldered obligations that belonged to American Casualty,
under the facts of this case and controlling Utah law, the University did no more than
it was obligated to do. For these reasons, as discussed below, the correct result of the
District Court should be affirmed.
VI.
A.

ARGUMENT

BECAUSE NURSE BROKA NEVER BECAME LEGALLY
OBLIGATED TO PAY ANY AMOUNTS IN THE HEPWORTH
SETTLEMENT, THE UNIVERSITY IS BARRED FROM
RECOVERING AGAINST AMERICAN CASUALTY.

The American Casualty Policy's Coverage Agreement provides that American
Casualty will pay amounts that Nurse Broka becomes "legally obligated to pay as a
result of injury or damage caused by a medical incident" for which he is responsible.
[R. 273 at § 1(A), Addendum E] (italics added; boldface in original.). The only
obligations that arose out of the Hepworth matter were the University's obligation to
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pay its self-insured retention and St. Paul's obligation to indemnify the University for
amounts in excess of that retention. Nurse Broka never incurred or paid any defense
expenses or incurred any personal obligations or any liability whatsoever. No
demands were made against Nurse Broka that would have triggered any of American
Casualty's coverage obligations.
Although the University asserts that Mrs. Hepworth "referred" to Nurse
Broka's alleged negligence during settlement discussions, the fact remains that Mrs.
Hepworth chose to pursue relief against the University alone, which by law would
have been required to defend and indemnify Nurse Broka even if she had made claims
against him. Put simply, the risk that a covered "claim" might be made against Nurse
Broka in connection with the Hepworth matter for which Nurse Broka would become
legally obligated to pay (and, therefore, entitled to coverage from American Casualty)
never materialized.
1.

The University Became Subrogated to Nothing

The University is proceeding on a theory that it became subrogated to Nurse
Broka's rights under the American Casualty Policy and, accordingly, steps into his
shoes and succeeds to his rights under the American Casualty Policy. Consequently,
the University has no greater rights than Nurse Broka would have against American
Casualty. See generally State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins.
Co., 912 P.2d 983, 985 (Utah 1996) (doctrine of equitable subrogation "allows a
person or entity which pays the loss or satisfies the claim of another under a legally
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cognizable obligation or interest to step into the shoes of the other person and assert
that person's rights").
The absence of any legal obligation on Nurse Broka's part to pay anything to
anyone not only forecloses his right to indemnification, but likewise forecloses the
University's rights as his putative subrogee.
a)

The Phrase "Legally Obligated to Pay" is Not
Ambiguous

The University contends that the phrase "legally obligated to pay" as it is used
in the American Casualty Policy is ambiguous, because "[i]t is reasonable to read this
language in its common law context to mean that if Nurse Broka negligently injures
someone (as Mrs. Hepworth contended), he is legally obligated to pay." See
University's Brief at 20. The University acknowledges that Nurse Broka's negligence
never was established but essentially argues nevertheless that the mere allegation that
Nurse Broka was negligent is sufficient for this Court to find that Nurse Broka became
legally obligated to pay some amount, thus triggering indemnity coverage under the
American Casualty Policy. The University is wrong.
Putting aside that the University raised this argument for the first time on
appeal, the University has taken the phrase entirely out of context and has construed it
in a fashion that conflates the duty to defend, which is triggered based on allegations
contained in a claim, and the duty to indemnify, which is triggered upon a
determination of the insured's liability for a covered loss. It is noteworthy that the
University cites no legal authority in support of this proposition. This is no surprise,
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as the University's argument is at odds with both Utah law and any reasonable
construction of the American Casualty Policy.
Utah courts have applied and enforced insuring agreement provisions
containing similar language. See, e.g.. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, f7,
27 P.3d 555, 558 (finding no indemnification coverage under homeowners' insurance
policy providing that insurer would pay "those damages which an insured becomes
legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage resulting from an
occurrence to which this coverage applies," despite fact that allegation of negligence
may have triggered defense coverage). The duty to indemnify is not based on the
allegations made against the insured, but on whether the action against the insured is
actually covered. Id.; see also Simmons v. Farmers Ins. Group, 877 P.2d 1255, 1258
n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Generally, insurers have a duty to defend any complaint
alleging facts which, if proven, would render the insurer liable for indemnification of
its insured. The duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify because it is
antecedent to and independent of the duty to indemnify") (emphasis added, citations
omitted).
In Therkelsen, for example, the insured was entitled to a defense for negligence
claims asserted against him, but ultimately was not entitled to indemnification
coverage because his conduct was found to be intentional, and thus outside of scope of
the policy's insuring agreement requiring that any legal obligation to pay be caused by
an "occurrence" - i.e., an accident. Citing to the policy's insuring agreement (which
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contained the "legally obligated to pay" language), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed
the award of summary judgment in the insurer's favor on the indemnification issue.
Utah's decisions are consistent with those from other jurisdictions that likewise
recognize that indemnification coverage simply is not triggered absent some
established obligation of the insured in the underlying litigation. See, e,g., Armstrong
World Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 690, 743-44 (Cal.
App. 1996) (duty to indemnify, as opposed to duty to defend, "cannot be determined in
advance of the insured's underlying liability

The duty to indemnify . . . arises

when the insured's underlying liability is established") (citations omitted); Ledford v.
Gutosjd, 877 P.2d 80, 85 (Oregon 1994) ("In order for the duty to indemnify to arise,
the insured must be liable for harm or injury that is covered by the policy. The record
in this case does not indicate whether Kuhl was in fact liable to Ledford for malicious
prosecution

[I] f Kuhl was not in fact liable for malicious prosecution, there is no

duty to indemnify because Kuhl was not legally obligated to pay money to Ledford");
Alaska Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Industrial Indem. Co.. 757 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Alaska 1988)
(where employer was dismissed from wrongful death action prior to any judicial
determination of its fault, the fact that a jury subsequently apportioned 30% of the
liability to the employer in a proceeding in which the employer was not a party was
insufficient to trigger an indemnity obligation under a policy that required that the
employer become "legally obligated to pay" damages, as there was no determination
of the employer's fault that was binding on the employer).
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The University's construction also is at odds with other portions of the
American Casualty Policy that make clear that the legal obligation to pay envisioned
in the American Casualty Policy's insuring agreement is an obligation that must be
fixed by a judgment against Nurse Broka following an actual trial, or by a settlement
agreement to which Nurse Broka and American Casualty were parties. For example,
the American Casualty Policy's "Legal Action Limitation" section provides in relevant
part:
You may not bring any legal action against us concerning this policy until:
A.
B,

you have fully complied with all provisions of this policy; and
the amount of your obligation to pay has been decided. Such
amount can be set by judgment against you after actual trial or by
written agreement between you, us and the claimant.

[R. 270 at § X, Addendum E]. 7
When the phrase "legally obligated to pay" in the American Casualty Policy's
insuring agreement is read in conjunction with the "Legal Action Limitation"
provision, it is clear that the only reasonable interpretation of that phrase requires that
there be a determination of Nurse Broka's liability via a judgment following an actual
trial, or an agreement between Nurse Broka, American Casualty and a loss claimant
fixing that liability. The mere allegation that he was liable does not suffice. This

This provision was not referred to in the parties' briefing below. American
Casualty points out this provision in response to the University's argument - raised for
the first time in its appeal brief- that the mere allegation that Nurse Broka was
negligent can somehow result in a legal obligation to pay.
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construction is consistent with Utah law, which requires that the terms of an insurance
contract be construed as a whole in order to give effect to all provisions of the policy.
Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992) ("Specifically, the terms of
insurance contracts, as well as all contracts, are to be interpreted in accordance with
their usually accepted meanings and should be read as a whole, in an attempt to
harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions").
b)

The University Has Not Met the Requirements For
Equitable Subrogation

The cases that the University relies on for its argument that it is entitled to
recover based on principles of equitable subrogation all have one requirement in
common - that there be some coverage obligation on the part of the insurer against
whom subrogation is sought in the first instance. In other words, Utah law requires
that there be some coverage obligation on the part of American Casualty to indemnify
Nurse Broka as an initial matter before the University, as his subrogee, can seek
recovery. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 931 P.2d 127, 136
(Utah 1997) (discussing requirements for equitable subrogation generally, and
rejecting in part one insurer's equitable subrogation claim in connection with defense
costs it had paid, because other insurer had no coverage obligations for underlying
action). As noted above, subrogation rights are purely derivative, and the University
succeeds only to those rights that Nurse Broka possessed against American Casualty
and has no greater rights. State Farm, 912 P.2d at 985.
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In addition, before subrogation rights arise, it must be shown that the party
against whom subrogation rights are asserted was primarily liable to pay the claim or
loss. State Farm, 912 P.2d at 985; Sharon Steel 931 P.2d at 137 (insurer can only
recover under a subrogation theory if it pays amounts that were "owed by another . . .
who ought to have paid it").
Within this analytical framework there is no scenario under the facts of this
case that would have triggered American Casualty's coverage obligations to Nurse
Broka that, in turn, would permit the University to "step into his shoes" as subrogee.
The insuring agreement of the American Casualty Policy provides coverage
only for amounts Nurse Broka becomes "legally obligated to pay" as damages caused
by his rendering or failing to render profesional services, and further provides for the
o

defense of "claims" made against him. However, (1) Mrs. Hepworth never made any
demands directly to Nurse Broka for anything, (2) Nurse Broka did not incur any costs
to defend himself in connection with Mrs. Hepworth's claims against the University,
and (3) there has been no judicial determination of his legal liability to the Hepworths
nor was there any settlement to which he was a named party that imposes any
obligation on him to pay anything to the Hepworths. [R. 299, Addendum G]. For
these reasons, American Casualty's obligations to defend and indemnify Nurse Broka
8

The American Casualty Policy defines "claim" to mean "the receipt by [Broka]
of a demand for money or services naming [Broka] and alleging a medical incident"
(bold in original). [R. 275 at § IV, Addendum E].
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never matured and he had neither the right nor the ability to demand that American
Casualty defend or indemnify him. In fact, he never made such a demand. Id.
An additional problem with the University's equitable subrogation theory is that
American Casualty was not primarily liable to pay for the University's settlement with
the Hepworths. As discussed infra at pp. 30-40, under the facts of this case, the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act effectively renders the University (and, by extension, its
insurer) solely liable for Nurse Broka's negligent conduct in the course of his
employment. Under the Act, Nurse Broka is entitled to absolute indemnity from the
University and the University is precluded from obtaining any recovery from Nurse
Broka or American Casualty. Accordingly, the University does not occupy a position
that is equitably superior to American Casualty's position.
Even indulging in the presumption that the University's liability to the
Hepworths derived from Nurse Broka's actions in whole or in part (which American
Casualty does not concede), it was the University and only the University that incurred
any liability in connection with the Hepworth matter. The American Casualty Policy
provides no coverage whatsoever for the University's own liability, no matter its
origin. As a result, the District Court correctly ruled that American Casualty is entitled
to summary judgment as a matter of law on the University's claims.
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2.

The Majority Of Jurisdictions Addressing the Indemnity
Issue Before This Court Have Decided the Issue in American
Casualty's Favor

One of the crucial issues on this appeal - whether a demand made solely against
a hospital based on the alleged negligence of its employee obligates the employee's
personal liability insurer to contribute to the hospital's settlement of that claim - has
been addressed by a handful of jurisdictions, which have ruled overwhelmingly in
favor of the employee's personal liability insurer. In contrast, the sole legal authority
relied on by the University in connection with this issue consists of a decision of the
Arizona Court of Appeal that applied a rule of law unique to Arizona, is based on a
dubious legal foundation, and that never has been relied upon by any published
decision of any court in any jurisdiction outside of Arizona for that same proposition.
Four out of five jurisdictions that have reported cases addressing the issue
before this Court have decided it in favor of American Casualty's position here. In
each of those cases, the courts held that even where a hospital is held liable based in
whole or in part on the acts or omissions of its employee, if no claim is made or suit
brought against the employee by the injured party, there is no basis to recover from the
employee's personal professional liability insurer.
California was the most recent jurisdiction to decide this issue on facts virtually
identical to those in the present case in American Continental Insurance Co. v.
American Casualty Co., 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 632 (Cal. App. 2001) ("ACIC (California)").
There, American Continental Insurance Company ("ACIC") sought contribution from
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American Casualty for an underlying settlement that ACIC paid on behalf of an
insured hospital based upon the alleged negligence of one of the hospital's nurses.
The nurse was an insured under the ACIC policy and also had her own individual
professional liability policy from American Casualty on terms identical to the one in
this case. The underlying lawsuit, however, did not name the nurse as a defendant nor
did the underlying plaintiffs assert a claim directly against her. ACIC settled the
underlying claim "on behalf of the Hospital and its employees" (which included the
nurse). American Casualty declined to contribute to the settlement. ACIC sued
American Casualty for contribution based on the theory that, because the hospital's
liability was derivative of the nurse's conduct, both of the nurse's insurers ought to
contribute to the underlying settlement. ACIC (California), 103 Cal Rptr. 2d at 63536.9
In a lengthy and well-reasoned opinion written by one of the leading authorities
on insurance coverage law, the California Court of Appeal rejected the argument. The
court observed that because no "claim" was asserted against the nurse by the
underlying plaintiffs, and because the underlying lawsuit was settled by ACIC
(meaning that the nurse did not become "legally obligated" to pay damages),

9

Although the University is proceeding under a subrogation and not a
contribution theory, the analysis is essentially the same insofar as both require a
determination of whether the employee's personal liability policy ever was triggered in
the first instance.
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American Casualty's duty to defend and indemnify the nurse never arose. ACIC
(California), 103 Cal Rptr. 2d at 638-39. On these facts, the court held:
Obviously, if the obligation to provide coverage under the
American Casualty policy never arose, then American
Casualty never at any time had any contractual obligation
with respect to the Gavino claim or action. And, as we
have extensively discussed, if there was no contractual
obligation, then there can be no successful assertion of a
claim for equitable contribution by ACIC merely because
it chose, in the pursuit of its own interests and obligations,
to settle the Gavino action by purchasing the peace of its
insureds, [the] Hospital and the Hospital's employees.
Under the facts of this case, American Casualty simply
was not a "co-obligor" who shared a liability with ACIC.
American Casualty never had any liability.
Id. at 639. Of similar import are St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 827 P.2d 1366, 1367 (Or. App. 1992) (rejecting contribution action
brought by hospital's insurer against nurse's insurer, reasoning that because no claim
was brought against the nurse, the nurse's policy was not implicated); Missouri
Professional Liability Ins. Ass'n v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, PA, 760 F. Supp.
783, 786 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (rejecting contribution claim brought by hospital's insurer
against nurse's insurer, reasoning that, because the nurse was not a party to the
underlying action, she was never "legally obligated to pay anything" and her policy
was not triggered); Medical Malpractice Ins. Ass'n v. Medical Liability Mut. Ins. Co.,
86 A.D.2d 476, 481 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (rejecting subrogation and contribution
claims made against doctors' insurer by hospital's insurer, reasoning that only the

-24-

hospital had been named in the suit and the doctors' policies did not cover the
hospital).
As these cases recognize, the risk that a professional liability policy covers is
that the insured will be sued and become legally obligated to pay damages because of
his or her professional negligence. These cases further recognize, as did the District
Court here, that where the insured is not party to a claim or any other proceeding that
seeks to hold the insured legally liable to pay damages, the risk insured against never
materializes. Here, because the University was the only entity against whom the
Hepworths specifically sought redress, and was the only entity that incurred a legal
obligation to pay the Hepworths via their settlement agreement, the theoretical risk
that Nurse Broka might be sued for medical negligence and become legally obligated
to the Hepworths never materialized.
The sole authority that the University relies upon is a discredited line of
authority from Arizona, the only jurisdiction to have reported a decision on this issue
the other way. Mutual Ins. Co. of Arizona v. American Cas. Co. of Reading, PA, 938
P.2d 71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996). The Mutual Ins. Co. case - which no published
decision outside of Arizona has followed - relied on the reasoning of an earlier
Arizona Court of Appeal decision entitled American Continental Insurance Co. v.
American Casualty Co. of Reading, PA, 903 P.2d 609 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) ("ACIC
(Arizona)"). Both Arizona decisions held on facts similar to those at bar that the
nurse's insurer was required to contribute to a settlement paid by the hospital's insurer,
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even though no claim was made against the nurse and the nurse incurred no legal
obligation to the injured claimant. Both decisions bolstered their reasoning by relying
on a decision of the California Court of Appeal, which the Arizona courts mis-read to
stand for the proposition that insurers' obligations vis-a-vis each other do not depend
on whether their mutual insured actually had claims asserted against him in the
underlying action for which he was exposed to legal liability. Mutual Ins. Co., 938
P.2d at 75; ACIC (Arizona! 903 P.2d at 611.
However, a few years after the ACIC (Arizona) decision, the California Court
of Appeal had occasion to review the Arizona court's interpretation of California law,
and noted that "[t]o the extent that [the Arizona court relied on California law], the
Arizona court wrongly applied California law

" ACIC (California), 103 Cal. Rptr.

2dat642n.l3.
The Arizona court's misconstruction and misapplication of California law
erodes the already shaky foundation on which the ACIC (Arizona) decision rests and
provides a further basis to confine these aberrant Arizona decisions to Arizona and not
to import them or their flawed logic into Utah.
3.

The "Claim" Issue Is A Red Herring

The University devotes a great deal of its opening brief to an argument that was
apparently not crucial to the District Court's judgment in favor of American Casualty,
nor is it essential to this Court's resolution of the case - whether a "claim" was made
against Nurse Broka within the meaning of American Casualty's Policy, which affects
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American Casualty's duty to defend Nurse Broka, not its duty to indemnify him.
According to the University, "[t]he absence of a claim made directly to Nurse Broka is
an irrelevant technicality," and the fact that the University advised American Casualty
of the Hepworths' demand on the University was enough to put American Casualty
"on notice" and to trigger coverage under the American Casualty Policy. See
University' s Brief at p. 11.
The University effectively concedes that any indemnification obligations under
the American Casualty Policy are governed by its insuring agreement, which states
that indemnification coverage is available only for amounts that Nurse Broka becomes
"legally obligated to pay." See University's brief at p. 12 (quoting Policy's coverage
agreement and acknowledging that "[t]he indemnification obligation arises when
Nurse Broka is 'legally obligated to pay' as a result of his negligence"). Because
Nurse Broka never became legally obligated to pay anything - regardless of whether a
"claim" was made against him - American Casualty's indemnification obligations
never were triggered. The District Court noted this as well:
Nurse Broka never had any claim made against him and
never became legally obligated to pay anything to the
Hepworths in connection with the University's and St.
Paul's settlement of the University's liability to the
10

The only significance of the existence of a "claim" is whether American
Casualty had an obligation to defend Nurse Broka, whose undisputed Affidavit
submitted to the District Court acknowledged that he neither requested a defense nor
incurred any defense costs in connection with the Hepworth matter. [R. 299 at Tflj 6-7,
Addendum G].
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Hepworths. Accordingly, none of American's obligations
under the policy it issued to Nurse Broka ever matured.
Consequently, American is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.
[R. 503, Addendum H]. 11
Notwithstanding that indemnity obligations are triggered only upon there being
a legal obligation for Nurse Broka to pay damages as a result of his negligence, the
University makes a strained attempt to prove that a "claim" was made against Nurse
Broka. That issue, however, is completely irrelevant to whether the American
Casualty Policy provided indemnity coverage for the University's settlement of the
Hepworths' claims against it.
The University argues that, although Nurse Broka never received notice of a
"claim," the University did, and because it effectively stands in his shoes as a subrogee
vis-a-vis American Casualty, the University's receipt of a claim and its demand that
American Casualty participate in the underlying settlement satisfies the American
Casualty Policy's "claim" requirement. See University's Brief at pp. 12-16. The

11

The University seemingly has misapprehended this aspect of the District
Court's opinion, suggesting in its brief at p. 19 that the District Court apparently
accepted American Casualty's arguments that were based on application of the Act,
even though the District Court expressly declined to reach that issue. [R. 504 at n. 8,
Addendum H]. While the District Court would have been correct to grant American
Casualty's motion based on the application of the Governmental Immunity Act, it
determined the lack of coverage solely on the basis of the fact that Nurse Broka never
became legally obligated to pay any amounls in connection with the Hepworth
settlement, essentially adopting the rationale of the cases discussed at pp. 20-24 of this
brief. [R. 496-505, Addendum H]. These cases provide an independent, and legally
correct, basis to support the District Court's ruling.
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University's attempt to transmute Mrs. Hepworth's demands on the University into
demands upon Nurse Broka, and then to contend that because the University is Nurse
Broka's subrogee, that a "claim" was made against Nurse Broka, is both novel and
remarkable, albeit unfounded in fact or controlling law. Tellingly, the only case that
the University cites to support this novel proposition is Hansen v. Barmore, 779 P.2d
1360 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), which is inapposite as it concerned whether a third party's
notice to the insurer of a claim against an insured satisfied an automobile policy's
notice requirement. Id. at 1363-1364. That case had nothing to do with whether there
was a "claim" under the terms of the automobile policy, nor does it bear on whether
there was a "claim" within the meaning of the American Casualty Policy.
In any event, the existence of a "claim" against Nurse Broka is not the proper
focus of this litigation and apparently did not factor into the District Court's ultimate
conclusion that the reason American Casualty was entitled to summary judgment is
because its insured, Nurse Broka, never became legally obligated to pay anything to
anyone in connection with the Hepworth matter.
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B.

UNDER THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT,
NURSE BROKA COULD NOT HAVE BEEN HELD
PERSONALLY LIABLE AND THERE IS NO RECOURSE
AGAINST HIM OR HIS INSURER.

As an independent basis for non-coverage, American Casualty asserted in its
summary judgment motion in the District Court that its obligations under the
American Casualty Policy were not triggered because the Act required the University
to defend and indemnify Nurse Broka, without recourse to any personal insurance that
may have been available to him. Although the District Court did not reach this issue,
it may be considered on appeal, as this Court may affirm the District Court's decision
if it is correct on any ground, even on grounds that the District Court did not address:
It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the
judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal
ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court
to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even
though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on
appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and
was not considered or passed on by the lower court.
Bailey v. Bavles, 2002 UT 58, ^[10, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161 (citations omitted).
1.

The Act Requires that the University Defend and Indemnify
Its Employees Without Recourse

Under the Act, the University cannot seek indemnification from Nurse Broka or
from his insurer, American Casualty. The Act provides that Nurse Broka - as an
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employee of the University Hospital - could not have been held personally liable for
any negligent acts or omissions occurring during the performance of his duties and
within the scope of his employment, because his employer, the University Hospital, is
a governmental entity. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4 (1991, amended 2002, Addendum
A).13 The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the University and the University
Hospital are state entities for purposes of the Act, and that their employees likewise
are state employees. See Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517, 519 (Utah 1980) (claim against
University of Utah Medical Center is claim against governmental entity); Wright v.
University of Utah, 876 P.2d 380, 383 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (applying Act as to
University employee); Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1991, amended 2003, Addendum
A) (specifically providing governmental immunity for state-owned university
hospitals). Because the Act's immunity extends to Nurse Broka, he never could have

The University acknowledges that Nurse Broka was an employee of the
Hospital who was working "in the course of providing care to Mr. Hepworth" at the
time of the alleged negligent conduct toward Mr. Hepworth. [R. 94 at ^j 3; R. 2-3 at ffl[
8-9, Addendum B]. Accordingly, there is no dispute that Nurse Broka was acting
within the scope of his employment for the University at the time of the incident.
13

The Act provides in part that, in connection with governmental employees, "no
employee may be held personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color
of authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to
fraud or malice." § 63-30-4(4) (1991, amended 2002, Addendum A). Governmental
employees are immune from suit in such a circumstance, unless the plaintiff alleges
specific facts supporting a claim of fraud or malice, which plaintiffs have not done
here. See, e ^ , Brown v. Wanlass, 2001 UT App. 30, f7, 18 P.3d 1137, 1139 (action
against government employee is barred because no evidence in record that employee
acted with fraud or malice).
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become "legally obligated to pay" anything as a result of the Hepworth matter, and the
American Casualty Policy never could have been triggered.
In fact, except in certain limited circumstances not present here, Nurse Broka
would have been entitled to a defense and absolute indemnification from the
University even if a claim had been made directly against him by the Hepworths. Id.
at § 63-30-36 (1991, amended 2002) (governmental entity "shall defend any action
brought against its employee arising from an act or omission occurring during the
performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of the employee's
employment, or under color of authority"), § 63-30-37 (1987) (if employee pays a
judgment entered against him, the entity must indemnify him and reimburse him for
defense costs).
Similarly, the Act prohibits the University from attempting to obtain indemnity
from Nurse Broka for its settlement with the Hepworths, even though - according to
the University - his alleged negligence gave rise to the claim against the University.
Section 63-30-38 provides that "[i]f a governmental entity pays all or part of a
judgment based on or a compromise or settlement of a claim against the governmental
entity or an employee, the employee may not be required to indemnify the
governmental entity for the payment." (Emphasis added).
Based on the Act and the facts of this case, the sole obligation to pay any
settlement or judgment that arose out of Nurse Broka's alleged negligence in the
course and scope of his employment with the University in connection with the
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Hepworth matter rests with the University. The settlement agreement that the
University entered into with the Hepworths settled all matters against the University
and its "agents, servants . . . and all other persons, firms, corporations, associations or
partnerships...[for claims] resulting from medical care and treatment rendered to Abel
Hepworth at the University Hospital," a release broad enough to include Nurse Broka,
an agent of the University, who presumably was only one of several University
employees who provided medical care and treatment to Mr. Hepworth and/or who
potentially were responsible for the alleged excess administration of fluids and any
surrounding events that may have contributed to Mr. Hepworth's death. Such other
individuals likely included, for example, the attending physician, the chief resident
who wrote the orders regarding administration of the fluids, the charge nurse and the
University's nursing educational staff who provided training to Nurse Broka, among
others. In entering into the Hepworth settlement to protect the University's employees
from personal liability for their alleged negligence, the University did no more than it
was statutorily obligated to do.
Because under the facts of this case Utah law statutorily immunizes Nurse
Broka from having to contribute to the University's settlement with the Hepworths, it
sensibly follows that he could not have become "legally obligated to pay" any amounts
to them or to reimburse the University for its payment of the settlement. It also
logically follows that American Casualty's indemnity obligations to Nurse Broka
never matured, because the American Casualty Policy provides coverage only for
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amounts that Nurse Broka becomes "legally obligated" to pay as damages based on his
negligence - a situation that did not arise and never could have arisen on the facts of
this case.
2.

The University Cannot Transfer Its Obligations Under The
Act To Its Employees' Insurers

The Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting an earlier version of the Act, and
courts in other jurisdictions interpreting similar immunity statutes have held that where
a government employee is immune from liability, not only is there no recourse against
the employee, but there also is no recourse against his personal insurer.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed this issue in Gulf Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann
Ins. Co., 567 P.2d 158 (Utah 1977) under an earlier but analogous version of the Act.14
In Gulf, a student sued a teacher for an injury sustained in a shop class. The teacher
demanded that the school district indemnify him, pursuant to the Utah Public

14

Gulf was decided under the Utah Public Employees Indemnification Act, § 6348-1 (1953). As stated by the Court in Gull "Sec. 63-48-1, U.C.A.1953, provides that
public entities (which includes school districts), shall' .. . protect (their) officers and
employees from personal liability arising from acts or omissions committed during the
performance of their duties, within the scope of their employment. . . .'" Id. at 159,
n.l. The Court also quoted Sec. 63-48-5, U.C.A.1953: "(1) Except as provided in
subsection (2) of this section, if a public entity pays all or part of any judgment based
on or a compromise or settlement of the claim against itself or an officer or employee,
the officer or employee is not liable to indemnify the public entity for this payment. (2)
If the public entity pays all or part of any judgment based on a claim against itself or
an officer or employee, the public entity may recover the amount of such payment if it
is established that the officer or employee acted or failed to act due to gross
negligence, fraud, or malice." Id. at 160, n.2. The relevant language from the version
of the Act applied in Gulf and the version in effect at the time the University sought
indemnification from Nurse Broka's insurer are substantially similar for purposes of
the analysis here.
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Employees' Indemnification Act, an earlier version of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act. The school district referred the matter to its insurer, Gulf, which in
turn demanded that Horace Mann - which had issued a group policy to the teacher
through the Utah Education Association - defend the suit or participate in the defense.
Horace Mann refused, claiming that the primary responsibility rested with the school
district and, by implication, its insurer Gulf, and that Horace Mann only had secondary
liability for any loss not covered by Gulf.
Gulf argued that despite the statutory immunity protection afforded to the
teacher, the teacher's insurer still should be required to participate. The Utah Supreme
Court disagreed, reasoning that each of the insurers should be regarded as standing in
the shoes of its own insured and as having the same rights and liabilities as its insured.
Because the school district was statutorily obligated to defend and indemnify the
teacher and was precluded from seeking any form of reimbursement or indemnity from
the teacher, the Court held that the district's insurer likewise had no ability to shift any
portion of the loss to the teacher's personal insurer. "[The statute].. .manifests] a
clear legislative intent that it is the school district and not the employee who must bear
any such a loss." Id. at 160. According to the court, the teacher's insurance was
excess over the insurance provided by Gulf, or would provide insurance for matters
excepted by the statute (i.e., if the employee acted with fraud or malice). Id.
American Casualty's position here is even stronger than Horace Mann's
position in the Gulf case. In Gulf, the teacher actually was named as a defendant in
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the underlying suit; here, no formal "claim" as defined by the American Casualty
Policy was ever made by the Hepworths specifically against Nurse Broka.
Government employees in Utah are afforded absolute statutory immunity - with a few
exceptions not applicable here - for acts or omissions occurring during the
performance of their duties and within the scope of their employment. As Gulf makes
clear, that protection effectively extends to the employee's insurer as well.
Other jurisdictions addressing immunity provisions analogous to the Act have
come to the same conclusion. For example, in Pacific Indemnity Co. v. American
Mutual Insurance Co., 105 Cal. Rptr. 295 (Cal. App. 1972), Pacific Indemnity insured
the Regents of the University of California and its employees. American Mutual was
the private insurer of a physician employed by the Regents. Both the Regents and the
physician were sued in a malpractice action and Pacific Indemnity defended and
settled the action on behalf of the Regents and the physician. Pacific Indemnity
thereafter sued the physician's insurer, American Mutual, for contribution. American
Mutual contended - and the Court of Appeal agreed - that provisions of the California
Government Code required the Regents to defend and indemnify its employees for
actions arising in the course and scope of employment. Accordingly, the Court held
that as the Regents' insurer, Pacific Indemnity was solely responsible for the loss
"because any attempt by the Regents to secure contribution from its employee or his
personal insurer would violate the legislative policy which gave rise to the provisions
[of the Government Code involving defense and indemnification of public
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employees]." Id. at 992 (emphasis added). As the court in Pacific Indemnity stated,
"there is no good reason why the employer's insurer should benefit from the prudence
of the public employee in providing himself with liability insurance which would
cover his acts or omissions which were not within the scope of his employment." Id.
Of similar import are United Pacific/Reliance Insurance Co. v Horace Mann
Insurance Co., 670 P.2d 172, 175-176 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (no apportionment among
school district and teacher's insurers because only school district was ultimately liable
for teacher's negligence as long as teacher was executing his job responsibilities;
employer's insurer should not benefit from the prudence of the public employee in
providing himself with additional liability insurance); St. Paul Ins. Cos. v. Horace
Mann Ins. Co., 231 N.W.2d 619, 625 (Iowa 1975) (St. Paul, as insurer of school
district and its teacher, is not entitled to contribution from Horace Mann, insurer of the
teacher; "[o]ne who must indemnify another cannot at the same time claim
contribution from that person") (cited with approval by Utah Supreme Court in Gulf);
Bridewell v. Board of Education. 276 N.E.2d 745, 750 (111. App. 1971) (regardless of
whether public employee has personal insurance, he is entitled to full indemnification
from his employer) (cited with approval by Utah Supreme Court in Gulf).
Here, the University's efforts to recover against American Casualty where it
would not be entitled to recover against Nurse Broka would serve as little more than
an attempted end-run around the protections afforded by the Act. Sanctioning those
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efforts would seriously undermine the protections of the Act as well as the Utah
Legislature's intent to provide broad immunity to Utah government employees.
3,

Coverage Under the American Casualty Policy Is Not Illusory

The University asserts that applying the protections of the Act to this case
would render American Casualty's coverage to Nurse Broka illusory for the brief
period that he was employed as a Utah State employee. The University's argument is
flawed for two reasons.
First, in Gulf, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that the question of what
coverage would be available under a personal liability policy issued to a government
employee in light of the application of governmental immunity was irrelevant:
What protection the school teachers may or may not
receive from defendant Horace Mann is not material here.
But, if may be of interest to observe that the latter's policy
does cover excess over that insured by plaintiff Gulf and
perhaps other matters excepted by the statute.
Gulf, 567 P.2d at 160.
Second, the University's argument ignores that Nurse Broka was a state
employee for only four months while he was insured by American Casualty, [R. 299 at
Tf 2, Addendum G], and that there were numerous instances in which the American
Casualty Policy would provide coverage to Nurse Broka while he was a University
employee. As noted above, as a state employee, Nurse Broka was immune for his
negligent conduct in the course and scope of his employment. However, the American
Casualty Policy provided coverage even in instances where he was not statutorily
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immune. For example, if Nurse Broka had provided freelance home health care
assistance, or if he had provided nursing care to family members, friends or neighbors,
or if he had provided "good Samaritan" assistance to a stranger, he would have been
covered under the American Casualty Policy, assuming he complied with the notice
and other provisions of the Policy. The University also overlooks that in addition to
professional liability coverage, the American Casualty Policy provided assault
coverage and personal liability coverage for non-business activities [see R. 277-280 at
§ I, Addendum E], all of which were valuable coverages unaffected by Nurse Broka's
status as a University employee.
The cases on which the University relies in an attempt to demonstrate that
American Casualty's coverage is somehow illusory are neither controlling nor, more
importantly, are they similar to the case at bar. In Monticello Insurance Co. v. Mike's
Speedway Lounge, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Ind. 1996), an insurer issued a general
liability policy to a bar that contained an "absolute alcohol" exclusion. The bar, which
by its very nature was in the business of serving alcohol, successfully argued that the
exclusion rendered the policy's coverage illusory because virtually any claim against
the bar would be "connected with" the business of serving alcohol. Id. at 700-701.
Unlike Monticello, this case does not present an analogous situation in which
American Casualty, for example, issued a nursing policy to Nurse Broka that
contained a "nursing exclusion."
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Similarly inapposite is Meyer v. Classified Insurance Co., 531 N.W.2d 416
(Wis. Ct. App. 1995), in which the insurer issued an underinsured motorists ("UIM"")
policy that purported to provide UIM coverage in the amount of $25,000 that was
triggered only in the event that the other driver's liability coverage was less than
$25,000. The court noted that in Wisconsin, however, the statutory minimum for
liability was $25,000, so enforcing the policy as written would mean that there never
would be a situation where the insurer would be obligated to pay a UIM claim, which
violated Wisconsin public policy. Id. at 418. Unlike Meyer, the fact that the
University's settlement with the Hepworths is not covered by the American Casualty
Policy does not mean there never could have been coverage under American
Casualty's Policy under any circumstance.
C.

AMERICAN CASUALTY HAS NOT WAIVED ITS COVERAGE
DEFENSES.

Finally, the University asserts that American Casualty somehow has waived its
ability to rely on the American Casualty Policy's insuring agreement, or to raise the
Act as a defense in this litigation. The University's waiver argument is misguided.
The requirements for waiver simply aire not met here. "Waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. To waive a right, there must be . . . an
intention to relinquish it. The party's actions or conduct must unequivocally evince an
intent to waive or must at least be inconsistent with any other intent." Clarke v.
American Concept Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added;
citations omitted) (insurer did not waive its right to disclaim coverage based on
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premium mailed after due date). There is no competent, admissible evidence that
American Casualty unequivocally intended to waive its right to disclaim coverage on
any ground.
To support its waiver argument, the University points to American Casualty's
July 17, 1997 letter [Addendum F] in which it declined to participate in the Hepworth
settlement. The University evidently has misunderstood American Casualty's letter,
and suggests that American Casualty did not actually deny coverage but instead said
that its Policy provided only excess coverage. See University's Brief at p. 16. To the
contrary, American Casualty's July 17, 1997 expressly advised the University that it
was declining to participate in settlement discussions concerning the Hepworth matter
because the University, as Nurse Broka's employer, should be primarily responsible to
provide coverage for his conduct. The letter also advised that "we would be
considered an excess carrier at best" [R. 291, Addendum F, emphasis added].
Any doubt about whether the University was fully aware that American
Casualty denied coverage is put to rest by the affidavit of Lynda Faldmo, the
University's risk manager. She attested that "[although the University invited
American Casualty Company of Reading, Pennsylvania to participate in settlement
negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth, it refused to participate or to provide coverage to
Nurse Broka" [R. 110 at ^f 8; emphasis added, Addendum D].
The University nonetheless contends that it has been prejudiced, because had it
known that American Casualty was going to insist that there be a "claim" against
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Nurse Broka as a prerequisite to coverage, it easily could have remedied "the technical
deficiency" by asking Mrs. Hepworth to make a demand on him. See University's
Brief at 16-17. Again, the University misses the point. As noted above, the indemnity
issue in this case hinges on whether Nurse Broka incurred a legal obligation to pay
damages to the Hepworth's because of his negligence, not on whether a "claim" was
made against him.
There is no evidence in the record to support the University's prejudice
argument. And, contrary to the University's speculation about what it might have
done to manufacture a "claim," there is nothing that it could have done in this case to
trigger American Casualty's indemnity obligation, because of the protections afforded
Nurse Broka under the Act. It could not change the fact that Nurse Broka never
incurred a legal obligation to pay damages to the Hepworths; it could not change the
fact that as a University employee, Nurse Broka was statutorily immune from personal
liability to the Hepworths and that the University was statutorily obligated to defend
and indemnify him; and it could not change the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in
Gulf, which essentially prohibits government entities from attempting to foist their
liabilities onto their employees'personal insurers.
As further support for its waiver argument, the University cites to a Utah
administrative regulation (§ 590-190-10(2)) requiring that insurers cite to a "specific
provision, condition or exclusion" in their policies when denying coverage. According
to the University, American Casualty's failure to cite the "legally obligated to pay"
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language of the insuring agreement when it denied coverage waived American
Casualty's ability to rely on that language here. However, the language contained in
the American Casualty Policy's insuring agreement is an affirmative element of the
University's claim to coverage. Under Utah law, the insured bears the initial burden of
proving that a claim has been made and comes within the scope of the policy's
insuring agreement. See LPS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah
1988) (burden of proving that claim falls within insuring agreement rests with
insured). As Nurse Broka's putative subrogee, it is the University's burden to prove
that the coverage agreement is triggered, i.e., that Nurse Broka became legally
obligated to pay some amount. As discussed above, the University failed to do so.
To the extent that the University likewise argues that the same administrative
regulation required American Casualty to also advise of its intent to rely on the Act,
American Casualty notes that the Act is not a "provision, condition, or exclusion" of
its Policy. See Utah Admin. Reg. § 590-190-10(2).15 Moreover, the protections
afforded by the Act are not American Casualty's to waive, and the University has
made no showing whatsoever that Nurse Broka ever waived his right to statutory
immunity or that such rights are even capable of being waived.

The Utah unfair claims settlement practices rules cannot be used to create
liability in any event. See Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2000 UT App. 10, ^ 2224, 994 P.2d 824, 828 (unfair claims settlement practices rules do not create a private
right of action against insurer).
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There is nothing unfair or inequitable about leaving the underlying liability
where it lies, with the University. American Casualty did not mislead the University
into believing that it would participate in the settlement, only to surprise the University
later by declining to do so. American Casualty declined to participate from the very
beginning. In analogous situations, the majority of jurisdictions have correctly held
that where an insurer denies coverage at the outset - as American Casualty did here it has not waived its ability to rely on policy provisions that were not mentioned in the
initial denial. These cases are based on the sound rationale that a policy's coverage
cannot be expanded to provide coverage that the insured did not purchase. See, e.g.,
Greenberg & Covitz v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 711 A.2d 909,
915 (N.J. Ct. App. 1998) (professional liability insurer did not waive exclusion by
failing to mention it in disclaimer letter; coverage could not be enlarged by waiver);
Waller v. Truck Ins. Exh., Inc., 900 P.2d 619, 636 (Cal. 1995) (insurer did not
impliedly waive coverage defenses that it failed to mention when it denied claim,
where denial letter did not indicate intention to relinquish additional reasons for denial;
noting that "of the 33 sister states to consider the issue, 32 agree"); Consolidated Rail
Corp. v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 676 F. Supp. 82, 85 (E.D. Pa. 1987) ("waiver
cannot operate to expand coverage under an insurance policy"). The University which is not even American Casualty's insured - simply cannot create coverage where
it otherwise does not exist.
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VII.

CONCLUSION

Here, the only equitable result would be for this Court to leave the liability for
the Hepworth settlement where it properly lies - with the University. In settling the
Hepworths' claim, the University did not assume any greater an obligation than it
otherwise had. The University's settlement with the Hepworths bought peace for the
University and all of its employees, for which the University is statutorily and solely
liable. Any determination to the contrary would re-write the American Casualty
Policy and permit the University to effectively escape its obligations under the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. For all the foregoing reasons, American Casualty
respectfully requests that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed.

Dated: July 31, 2003
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM A
Pertinent provisions of Utah Governmental Immunity Act

LEXSTAT Utah Code Ann. @ 63-30-3
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2002 6TH SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2003 UT 1, 2003 UT APP 13***
*** AND JANUARY 17, 2003 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (2003)
STATUS: CONSULT SLIP LAWS CITED BELOW FOR RECENT CHANGES TO THIS DOCUMENT LEXSEE
2003 Ut. ALS 3 - See section 5.
§ 63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit
(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury
which results from the exercise of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other
governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical
training program conducted in either public or private facilities.
(2) (a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical programs and services performed at a
state-owned university hospital are unique or essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and are
considered to be governmental functions:
(i) care of a patient referred by another hospital or physician because of the high risk nature of the patient's
medical condition;
(ii) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a state-owned university hospital or provided in Utah
only by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their employment;
(iii)care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or treatment at another medical facility in
Utah; and
(iv) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned university hospital or by physicians employed at
a state-owned university acting in the scope of their employment that a court finds is unique or essential to the core of
governmental activity in this state.
(b) If any claim under this subsection exceeds the limits established in Section 63-30-34, the claimant may submit
the excess claim to the Board of Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6.
(3) The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the construction, repair, and operation of flood
and storm systems by governmental entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and
their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage resulting from those activities.
(4) Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from suit for any injury which results from
their joint intergovernmental functions at a center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4a.
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HISTORY: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 3; 1978, ch. 27, § 2; 1981, ch. 116, § 2; 1984, ch. 33, § 1; 1985, ch. 93, § 1; 1991, ch.
15, § 1; 1991, ch. 248, § 7.
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UTAH 2003 SESSION LAWS
55th LEGISLATURE, 2003 GENERAL SESSION
Copr. ©

West Group 2003.

All rights reserved.

Additions are indicated by | S | ; deletions by
Text. Changes in tables are made but not highlighted.
Ch. 3 (H.B. 160)
WEST'S NO. 325
EMERGENCY HEALTH RESPONSE AMENDMENTS

This act amends professional licensing provisions, the powers and duties of local
health departments, and provisions related to immunity from liability for
governmental entities and certain professionals. The act establishes exceptions to
certain licensing standards when a national, state, or local emergency is declared.
The act amends certain prescription drug dispensing rules when emergencies are
declared. The act authorizes local departments of health to investigate suspected
bioterrorism and diseases and to provide
public health assistance in a declared
emergency. The act provides limited immunity from civil damages for governmental
entities and certain health professionals responding to a declared emergency. This
act has an immediate effective date.

This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated 1953 as follows:

AMENDS:

26A-1-114, as last amended by Chapter 249, Laws of Utah 2002

58-1-307, as last amended by Chapter 63, Laws of Utah 2001

58-13-2, as last amended by Chapter 160, Laws of Utah 2000

58-17a-620, as enacted by Chapter 247, Laws of Utah 1996

63-30-3, as last amended by Chapters 15 and 248, Laws of Utah 1991

78-11-22, as last amended by Chapter 211, Laws of Utah 1987

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
•

*

*

Section 5. Section 63-30-3 is amended to read:

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

UTLEGIS3(2003)
2003 Utah Laws Ch 3(HB 160)

Page 2

«
§

UT ST §

63-30-3

»

63-30-3. Immunity of governmental entities from suit.

(1) Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities
are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other
governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nursing, or other
professional health care clinical training program conducted in either public or
private facilities.

+^H|51(a) For the purposes of this chapter only, the following state medical
programs and services performed at a state-owned university hospital are unique or
essential to the core of governmental activity in this state and are considered to
be governmental functions:
(I) care of a patient referred by another hospital or physician because of the
high risk nature of the patientfs medical condition;
( n ) high risk care or procedures available in Utah only at a state-owned
university hospital or provided in Utah only by physicians employed at a stateowned university acting in the scope of their employment;
( m ) care of patients who cannot receive appropriate medical care or treatment at
another medical facility in Utah; and
(IV) any other service or procedure performed at a state-owned university hospital
or by physicians employed at a state-owned university acting in the scope of their
employment that a court finds is unique or essential to the core of governmental
activity in this state.
(b) If any claim under this Subsection j§f|f exceeds the limits established in
Section 63-30-34, the claimant may submit the excess claim to the Board of
Examiners and the Legislature under Title 63, Chapter 6.
-f3-Hfifii

Tne

management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the
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construction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental entities and
their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or damage
resulting from those activities.
Officers and employees of a Children's Justice Center are immune from suit
for any injury which results from their joint intergovernmental functions at a
center created in Title 62A, Chapter 4a|

Section 7. Effective date.

#H
S££M
Effective February 18, 2003.

Approved February 18, 2003.

UT LEGIS 3 (2003)
END OF DOCUMENT
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UTAH CODE, 1953
TITLE 63, STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
Copyright ©

2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session

63-30-4 Act provisions not construed as admission or denial of liability — Effect
of waiver of immunity — E x c l u s i v e remedy ---Joinder of employee -- Limitations on
personal liability.

(1) (a) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, may be
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility by or for
governmental entities or their employees.
(b) If immunity from suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is
granted, and liability of the entity shall be determined as if the entity were a
private person.
(c) No cause of action or basis of liability is created by any waiver of
immunity in this chapter, nor may any provision of this chapter be construed as
imposing strict liability or absolute liability.
(2) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as adversely affecting any immunity
from suit that a governmental entity or employee may otherwise assert under state
or federal law.
(3) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3)(b), an action under this chapter
against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury caused by an act or
omission that occurs during the performance of the employee's duties, within the
scope of employment, or under color of authority is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy.
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or proceeding
based upon the same subject matter against the employee or the estate of the
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless:
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice;
(ii) the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth in
Subsection 63-30-36(3)(c); or
(iii) in a judicial or administrative proceeding the employee intentionally
or knowingly gave, upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by law as a substitute
for an oath, false testimony material to the issue or matter of inquiry under this
section.
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in a
representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which the
governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held personally liable
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for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's duties,
within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, unless it is
established that:
(a) the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice;
(b) the injury or damage resulted from the conditions set forth in Subsection
63-30-36(3)(c)/ or
(c) in a judicial or administrative proceeding the employee intentionally or
knowingly gave, upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by law as a substitute
for an oath, false testimony material to the issue or matter of inquiry under this
section.

History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 4; 1978, ch. 27, §
76, § 1; 2002, ch. 206, § 2.

3; 1983, ch. 129, §

3; 1991, ch.

Amendment Notes. — T h e 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, added Subsection
(3)(b)(iii), added subsection designations in Subsection (4), added Subsections
(4)(b) and (c), and made related changes.
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*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2003 FIRST SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2003 UT 11, 2003 UT APP 101 ***
*** AND MARCH 28, 2003 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-28 (2003)
§ 63-30-28. Liability insurance — Purchase of insurance or self-insurance by governmental entity authorized —
Establishment of trust accounts for self-insurance
(l)Any governmental entity within the state may purchase commercial insurance, self-insure, or self-insure and
purchase excess commercial insurance in excess of the statutory limits of this chapter against any risk created or
recognized by this chapter or any action for which a governmental entity or its employee may be held liable.
(2) (a) In addition to any other reasonable means of self-insurance, a governmental entity may self-insure with
respect to specified classes of claims by establishing a trust account under the management of an independent private
trustee having authority with respect to claims of that character to expend both principal and earnings of the trust
account solely to pay the costs of investigation, discovery, and other pretrial and litigation expenses including attorneys'
fees, and to pay all sums for which the governmental entity may be adjudged liable or for which a compromise
settlement may be agreed upon.
(b) The monies and interest earned on said trust fund shall be subject to investment pursuant to Title 51, Chapter
7, State Money Management Act of 1974, and shall be subject to audit by the state auditor.
(3) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, the trust agreement between the governmental entity and the trustee
may authorize the trustee to employ counsel to defend actions against the entity and its employees and to protect and
safeguard the assets of the trust, to provide for claims investigation and adjustment services, to employ expert witnesses
and consultants, and to provide such other services and functions necessary and proper to carry out the purposes of the
trust.
HISTORY: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 28; 1978, ch. 27, § 9; 1979, ch. 94, § 1; 1983, ch. 130, § 1; 1985, ch. 21, § 32; 1991,
ch. 203, § 5.
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Copyright ©

2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the

LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved.
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session

63-30-36 Defending government employee — R e q u e s t — C o o p e r a t i o n — P a y m e n t of
judgment.

(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a governmental entity shall
defend any action brought against its employee arising from an act or omission
occurring:
(a) during the performance of the employee's duties;
(b) within the scope of the employee's employment; or
(c) under color of authority.
(2) (a) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee against a claim, the
employee shall make a written request to the governmental entity to
defend him:
(i) within ten days after service of process upon him; or
(ii) within a longer period that would not prejudice the governmental entity
in maintaining a defense on his behalf; or
(iii) within a period that would not conflict with notice requirements
imposed on the entity in connection with insurance carried by the entity relating
to the risk involved.
(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or fails to reasonably cooperate
in the defense, the governmental entity need not defend or continue to defend the
employee, nor pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement against the employee in
respect to the claim.
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend, or subject to any court rule
or order, decline to continue to defend, an action against an employee if it
determines:
(a) that the act or omission in question did not occur:
(i) during the performance of the employee's duties;
(ii) within the scope of his employment; or
(iii) under color of authority;
(b) that the injury or damage resulted from the fraud or malice of the

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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employee; or
(c) that the injury or damage on which the claim was based resulted from:
(i) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical control of a
vehicle:
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or greater by weight than the
established legal limit;
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any drug to a degree that
rendered the person incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree
that rendered the person incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or
(ii) the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be unable to
reasonably perform his job function because of the use of alcohol, because of the
nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-4, or
because of the combined influence of alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled
substance as defined by Section 58- 37-4; or
(d) that in a judicial or administrative proceeding the employee intentionally
or knowingly gave, upon a lawful oath or in any form allowed by law as a substitute
for an oath, false testimony to the issue or matter of inquiry under this section.
(4) (a) Within ten days of receiving a written request to defend an employee, the
governmental entity shall inform the employee whether or not it shall provide a
defense, and, if it refuses to provide a defense, the basis for its refusal.
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense is not admissible for any
purpose in the action in which the employee is a defendant.
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (6), if a governmental entity conducts the
defense of an employee, the governmental entity shall pay any judgment based upon
the claim.
\
(6) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee under a
reservation of rights under which the governmental entity reserves the right not to
pay a judgment, if the conditions set forth in Subsection (3) are established.
(7) (a) Nothing in this section or Section 63-30-37 affects the obligation of a
governmental entity to provide insurance coverage according to the requirements of
Subsection 41-12a-301(3) and Section 63-30-29.5.
(b)
defend,
(3), it
304 and

When -a governmental entity declines to defend, or declines to continue to
an action against its employee under the conditions set forth in Subsection
shall still provide coverage up to the amount specified in Sections 31A-2263-30-29.5.

History: C. 1953, 63-30-36, enacted by L. 1983, ch. 131, §
1991, ch. 76, § 9; 2002, ch. 206, § 3.

4; 1987, ch. 30, §
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Amendment Notes. — T h e 2002 amendment, effective May 6, 2002, added Subsection
(3) (d) .

Copr. © West 2003 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works

LEXSTAT Utah Code Ann. 63-30-37
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2002 6TH SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2003 UT 1, 2003 UT APP 13 ***
*** AND JANUARY 17, 2003 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-37 (2003)
§ 63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by government employee
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a judgment entered against him, or any portion of it, which the
governmental entity is required to pay under Section 63-30-36, the employee may recover from the governmental entity
the amount of the payment and the reasonable costs incurred in his defense.
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of an employee against a claim, or conducts the defense
under an agreement as provided in Subsection 63-30-36(6), the employee may recover from the governmental entity
under Subsection (1) if:
(a) the employee establishes that the act or omission upon which the judgment is based occurred during the
performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or under color of authority, and that he conducted the
defense in good faith; and
(b) the governmental entity does not establish that the injury or damage resulted from:
(i) the fraud or malice of the employee;
(ii) the employee driving a vehicle, or being in actual physical control of a vehicle:
(A) with a blood alcohol content equal to or greater by weight than the established legal limit;
(B) while under the influence of alcohol or any drag to a degree that rendered the person incapable of safely
driving the vehicle;
(C) while under the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that rendered the person
incapable of safely driving the vehicle; or
(iii) the employee being physically or mentally impaired so as to be unable to reasonably perform his job
function because of the use of alcohol, because of the nonprescribed use of a controlled substance as defined in Section
58-37-4, or because of the combined use of alcohol and a nonprescribed controlled substance as defined in Section 5837-4.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 63-30-37, enacted by L. 1983, ch. 131, § 5; 1987, ch. 30, § 2.

LEXSTAT Utah Code Ann. 63-30-38
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright (c) 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.
a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2002 6TH SPECIAL SESSION ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2003 UT 1, 2003 UT APP 13 ***
*** AND JANUARY 17, 2003 (FEDERAL CASES) ***
TITLE 63. STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
CHAPTER 30. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT
GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-38 (2003)
§ 63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a judgment based on or a compromise or settlement of a claim against the
governmental entity or an employee, the employee may not be required to indemnify the governmental entity for the
payment.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 63-30-38, enacted by L. 1983, ch. 131, § 6.

ADDENDUM B
Complaint filed by University of Utah Hospital and University of Utah against
American Casualty (erroneously sued as Continental Casualty)

F I L M DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC 2 31998
DAVID G. WILLIAMS (A3481)
TERENCE L. ROONEY (A5789)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801)521-9000

By

SALT LAKE COUNTY
.
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL
AND UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,

COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs,

civi,No. qOQC\ J 3 I 5 0

vs.

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an Illinois
corporation,

Judge

:TVAM

SAtt

Defendant.

Plaintiff complains of Defendant as follows:
PARTIES AND JURISDICTION
1.

Plaintiffs University of Utah Hospital and University of Utah (hereinafter "the

University") are located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and are agencies of the State of Utah.

2.

Defendant Continental Casualty dba CNA Insurance Companies (hereinafter

"CNA") is an Illinois corporation registered to do business, and doing business, as an insurance
company in the State of Utah.
3.

Venue and jurisdiction are proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-13-4 and

Section 31A-1-105.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
4.

At all relevant times, CNA provided nursing professional liability insurance to

Nurse Troy Alan Broka (hereinafter "Nurse Broka"), issued through American Casualty
Company, which was in effect at all times material to this claim.
5.

A copy of Nurse Broka's aforementioned professional liability policy with CNA

is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference.
6.

Nurse Broka's professional liability coverage provided limits of liability, in the

event of a claim arising from the rendering of professional nursing services by Nurse Broka, in
the amounts of $1,000,000 for each medical incident and $3,000,000 aggregate.
7.

Nurse Broka's CNA policy provided professional liability coverage to him for,

among other things, injury or damages caused by a medical incident arising out of care provided
by Nurse Broka.
8.

During April of 1997, Nurse Broka was employed by the University, working as

a travel nurse at the University Hospital.

-2-

9.

While working in the Hospital, Nurse Broka provided nursing care to Abel

Hepworth, who was admitted on April 10, 1997 for surgical repair of an aneurysm.
10.

In providing care to Mr. Hepworth, Nurse Broka negligently misread a physician's

order for the infusion of IV fluids and infused Mr. Hepworth with an excessive amount of fluids;
specifically NS with KCL at 500 cc. per hour instead of the 100 cc. per hour ordered by the
physician.
11.

As a result of the fluid overload suffered by Mr. Hepworth from the incorrect

administration of fluids, Mr. Hepworth died on April 14, 1997.
12.

Shortly following the death of Mr. Hepworth, the Hospital was informed by his

wife, Susan Hepworth, acting individually and on behalf of the Hepworth minor children, Alex
Hepworth and Ammon Hepworth, (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Hepworths") that
she intended to commence a lawsuit against the University based on the care provided to her
husband by Nurse Broka; specifically, the excessive administration of fluids.
13.

Prior to commencing a lawsuit, Mrs. Hepworth initiated settlement negotiations

with the University.
14.

On or about June 11, 1997, counsel for the University informed CNA of the

aforementioned facts involving Nurse Broka and invited CNA's participation in the settlement
negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth.
15.

By letter of July 17, 1997, CNA declined to participate in the settlement

negotiations.
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16.

On or about July 10, 1997, counsel for the University tendered the defense and

indemnification of Nurse Broka to CNA. Defendant did not respond.
17.

Because Nurse Broka was an agent of the University and because his negligence

caused Mr. Hepworth's death, the Hepworths' claims were subsequently settled by the University
with Mrs. Hep worth.
18.

In exchange for releasing her claims and the claims of her minor children against

the University, the University and its excess insurance carrier, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Company, paid Mrs. Hepworth and her minor children in excess of $1,000,(XX).
19.

The University's only liability insurance applicable to the Hepworths' claims was

an excess liability policy with St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Companies, under which the
University had a $1,000,000 per occurrence self retention. Accordingly, the University was
uninsured for the first $1,000,000 of the Hepworth's claims and the University paid $1,000,000
in settlement proceeds and defense costs to settle the claims.
20.

The remainder of the setdement paid to the Hepworths, in excess of the $1,000,000

paid by University, was paid by its excess insurance carrier, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Companies.
21.

The entire settlement paid to the Hepworths was paid as a result of and arising out

of the care rendered by Nurse Broka.

-4-

FIRST CLAM FOR RELIEF
(SUBROGATION-BREACH OF DUTY TO DEFEND)
22.

The University realleges and incorporates herein by this reference paragraphs 1

through 21 inclusive
23.

By CNA's failure to participate in the setdement and failure to defend Nurse Broka

against the aforementioned claims, CNA breached the duty arising under its policy to defend
Nurse Broka.
24.

Because CNA breached its duty to defend Nurse Broka, the University of Utah paid

such defense costs and is therefore subrogated and entitled to recover such defense costs, plus
interest, from CNA.
25.

Accordingly, the University is entitled to judgment against CNA for the costs and

attorneys' fees of negotiating and defending the Hepworths' claims against the University arising
out of the care provided by Nurse Broka in the amount of $8,459.20 with interest thereon at the
legal rate.
SECOND CAUSE QF ACTION
(EQUITABLE SUBROGATION)
26.

The University realleges and incorporates herein by this reference paragraphs 1

through 25 inclusive.
27.

By CNA's failure to participate in the settlement and failure to defend Nurse Broka

against the aforementioned claims, CNA failed to comply with its policy provisions requiring it

-5-

to pay all amounts up to policy limits for which Nurse Broka became legally obligated to pay as
a result of injuries caused by a medical incident arising from care provided by Nurse Broka.
27.

Because CNA breached its duty to pay the aforementioned settlement amounts, the

University paid is subrogated to recover such amount, plus interest, from CNA.
28.

Accordingly, the University is entitled to judgment against CNA, with interest

thereon at the legal rate.
WHEREFORE, the University prays for judgment against Defendant as follows:
1.

Under its First Cause of Action, reimbursement of its defense costs in the amount

of $8,459.20, together with interest thereon at the legal rate;
2.

Under its Second Cause of Action, for $1,000,000, together with interest thereon

at the legal rate; and
3.

For its costs herein incurred and such other relief, including attorneys' fees, as the

Court deems just and appropriate.
DATED thi^7g^/7day of December, 1998.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Terence L/Rooney
'
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Plaintiffs' Address:
50 North Medical Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84132
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ADDENDUM C
District Court's orders granting/jro hac vice admission of Alec M. Barinholtz and
Jennifer Mathis

FILED DISTRICT C0UIT
Third judicial District

JarylL. Rencher#4903
EPPERSON & RENCHER
Attorneys for Defendant American Casualty Company
10 West 100 South, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 983-9800

FEB - 6 2002
JLAKE^OWITY
Deputy Clerk

THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
Plaintiffs,
v.

ORDER ON MOTION AND
CONSENT OF DESIGNATED
ASSOCIATE LOCAL COUNSEL

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an Illinois
corporation,
Defendant.
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota
Corporation
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 980913150
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an Illinois
Corporation, and TROY ALAN BROKA,
Defendants.

The Court, having reviewed the Motion of Designated Associate Local Counsel, and based
on the facts contained herein, and for good cause shown, hereby

ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Alec Barinholtz is hereby admitted pro hac
vice to practice in this court.
DATED this j&l day of February, 2002.
BY THE COl
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FILED DISTRICT C0UIT
Third Judicial District

Jaryl L. Rencher #4903
EPPERSON & RENCHER
Attorneys for Defendant American Casualty Company
10 West 100 South, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone. (801) 983-9800

EB - 6 2002
LAKEV:OUNJY
Deputy Cterk

THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
Plaintiffs,
v.
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an Illinois
corporation,
Defendant.
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota
Corporation

)
)
)
;
;
]
]
;
;

V.

))
;»

CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an Illinois
Corporation, and TROY ALAN BROKA,

;
)
)

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION AND
CONSENT OF DESIGNATED
ASSOCIATE LOCAL COUNSEL

Civil No. 980913150
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

]

The Court, having reviewed the Motion of Designated Associate Local Counsel, and based
on the facts contained herein, and for good cause shown, hereby

ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that Jennifer Mathis is hereby admitted pro hac
vice to practice in this court.

A

DATED this £/_ day of February, 2002.
BYTHECOl

JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI

ADDENDUM D
Affidavit of Lynda Faldmo

TERENCE L. ROONEY (A5789)
JULIANNE P. BLANCH (A6495)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MAR7TNEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
Telephone: (801)521-9000
Facsimile: (801) 363-0400

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
Plaintiffs,

AFFIDAVIT OF LYNDA FALDMO

vs.
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF
READING, PA,

Case No. 980913150 CN
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendant.

ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF
READING, PA, and TROY ALAN BROKA,
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
I, Lynda Faldmo, being duly sworn, state under oath as follows:
1.

This affidavit is based on my personal knowledge, and I am over 21 years of age.

2.

I am the Director of Risk Management for the University of Utah Hospital and

have been so employed since September 1994.
3*

I am familiar with a claim asserted by Mrs. Susan Hepworth arising from the

death of her husband Abel Hepworth at the University of Utah Hospital on April 14,1997.
4.

During April 1997, the University hired Troy Broka as a traveling nurse working

at the University of Utah Hospital.
5.

Nurse Broka provided nursing care to Mr. Abel Hepworth, a University of Utah

Hospital patient, who was admitted on April 10, 1997, for surgical repair of an aneurysm. In the
course of providing care to Mr. Hepworth, Mrs. Hepworth contends that Nurse Broka misread a
physician's order for the infusion of IV fluids and infused Mr. Hepworth with an excessive
amount of fluids. She also maintains that her husband died as a result of Nurse Broka
administering an excessive amount of fluids contrary to the physician's instructions.
6.

Shortly after Mr. Hepworth died, his wife informed the University of her intention

to file a medical malpractice lawsuit arising out of the care rendered by Nurse Broka on her
behalf and that of her minor children. She initiated settlement negotiations with the University
before filing a lawsuit.

2

7.

The University was self-insured for professional liability claims up to $1,000,000,

meaning that it would pay judgments or settlements against it out of its pocket up to $1,000,000.
This is set forth in the University of Utah Professional Liability Self-Insurance Trust Agreement.
8.

Although the University invited American Casualty Company of Reading,

Pennsylvania to participate in settlement negotiations with Mrs. Hepworth, it refused to
participate or to provide coverage to Nurse Broka. The University settled Mrs. Hepworth's claim
in 1998 for over $1,000,000. The University paid $1,000,000 to Mrs. Hepworth and her two
minor childrenfromthe self-insurance fund, and St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance paid the
remainder.
DATED this ZZ** day of February, 2002.

yy^^-

/^u/^cQ

ynaalFaldmo
Lynda
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this >?l^day of February, 2002.

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in the State of Utah
My Commission Expires:
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ADDENDUM E
American Casualty Policy issued to Nurse Troy Alan Broka

PROFESSIONAL NURbcS
LIABILITY PROGRAM
DECLARATIONS

Item

CNA Insurance Companies
C N A Plaza
Oi»cago, Illinois 60605

for ABC

INSURANCE IS PROVIDED BY THE COMPANY DESIGNATED BELOW
(A stock insurance company, herein called We, Us or Our)
NAME OF INSURED AND ADDRESS (Number & Street, City. State & Zip)

American Casualty Company of Reading, Pa.
Troy Alan Broka
3 7 6 i Dimdas Road
B e a v e r t o n , MI 48612-9159

POLICY TERM

12:01 A H

/ i*t>

l*r

4/22/96

L tftry ln-i

j o 4/ 2 2 / 9 7

*T

V

STANDARD TIME

OUR ADDRESS Afi

STATED ABOVE.

T

LIMITS OF LIABILITY

COVERAGE PART

S

1,000,000.00

each medical incident

$

3,000,000.00

aggregate

$

1,000,000.00

each incident

1,000.00
50,000.00

PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY

each person
MEDICAL EXPENSE
aggregate

Included

each claim

Included

aggregate

300.00

NON-BUSINESS ACTIVITIES

PERSONAL INJURY

per day
DEFENDANTS REIMBURSEMENT

6,000.00

pre trial/proceeding

1,000.00

per assault

92.00

FIRST PARTY ASSAULT

ANNUAL PREMIUM FOR THIS POLICY

Printed Endorsements Attached At Policy Issuance (Insert Form Numbers):
G-58Q32-B, G - U 7 1 5 - 0 2 1 , G-58033-A21

This Policy shall not be valid unless countersigned by a duly authorized representative of this Company.

^ U A ^
Chairman of thej Board

Secretory

C—->

Countersigned by (
G-42098-&O)

Authorized Representative

(fid 4/92)

9, Wo

CA/A

F.»r AM the 0>mmien»^i» Vug ,Mukt-

STATE PROVISIONS—MICHIGAN
Any cancellation or non-renewal provisions contained
m the policy to which this endorsement is attached
are deleted and replaced by the following:
I,

Cancellation
A. This policy c^n De cancelled by either the first
of you named or us.,
1. You can cancel this policy at any time. To
do sor you must:
a. return the policy to us or any of our
authorized representatives; or
b. give notice to us or any of our authorized
representatives;
stating when the cancellation is to be
effective. We must receive the policy or
written notice before the cancellation date.
2. We can cancel this policy by giving written
notice to you at least:
a. 10 days, if cancellation is for nonpayment of premium. However, you may
continue the coverage by payment in full
at any time prior to the date the
cancellation is effective; or
b. 30 days, if cancellation is for any other
reason;
before the date the cancellation is effective.
B. We will mail or deliver notice to you at the last
mailing address known to us or our authorized
representative.
C. Notice of cancellation will state the date the
cancellation is effective. The policy will end
on that date. The grounds for such
cancellation shall also be stated, and upon
your written request, we shall furnish the facts
upon which the cancellation is based.
0- If notice is mailed, proof of mailing will be
sufficient proof of notice.
E. If this policy is cancelled, we will send the
first of you named any premium refund due.
The refund will be on a pro-rata basis, subject
to a minimum earned premium ot S25.00.
The cancellation will be effective even if we
have not made or offered a refund.
F if this policy has been in effect for more than
90 days, or is a renewal, we shall not cancel
this policy except for one or more of the
following conditions:
1. non-payment of premium;

2, any:
a, material misrepresentation; or
G-11715-H21
(ED 02/91)

b. non-disdosure of any fact which if
known would affect insurability or cause
the policy noc to be issued;
by or with the knowledge of you or your
representatives;
3. any fraud relating to this policy or to a claim
made under this policy;
4. actions by you that have -substantially
increased or changed the risk insured;
5. discovery of any willful or reckless acts or
omissions by you which increases ttie
hazard insured against;
6. a material increase in the hazard insured
against:
a. which coufd not have been reasonably
contemplated at the inception of the
contract;
b. including such increase as a result of
x^nange^ in rxries, "legmtetion or court
decision;
7. failure to comply with reasonable loss
control or safety recommendations;
8. substantial breach of contractual duties,
conditions or agreements;
9. substantial loss of reinsurance by us
affecting this particular type of insurance,
certified to the insurance regulatory
authority.
Non-ftertewal
If we decide not to renew this policy, 45 days
advance written notice shall be mailed or
delivered to you at the address last known by us
or our authorized representative. The notice shall
include the reason for such nonrenewal*
This provision shall not apply in the event:
A. of non-payment of premium;
EL we have implied or consented to renewal; or
C. you have:
1. requested OT atjrest} to riotvrenewaV, or
2. insured elsewhere or accepted replacement
coverage.
In the event we are willing to renew this policy,
a premium billing notice shall be mailed or
delivered to you at the address test known to us
or our authorized representative not less than 45
days in advance of the renewal or anniversary
date of this policy. The premium billing notice
shall be based upon the rates and rules
applicable to the ensuing policy period,

au

?*'

\ M f | n > ( M,|,m)»»»»• »•»<• V . H *».»*•

For Attachment to Policy

WAIVER OF EXCLUSION
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
We agree with you that the exclusion referring "to an award of punitive or exemplary damages" does not apply to your
policy.

All other provisions of the policy remain unchanged.

G^41529-B99
For Attachment to Policy

•

MICHIGAN STATE PROVISION
STATE LAW
If this Coverage Part conflicts with state or local laws, then it is changed to conform with the laws.
All other provisions o( the policy remain unchanged.

G-57243-A21
(ED. 09/66)

G S8C33-A?1
ffU) 10/87}

*ie>r

Pur All th* Commltmema Yoo Blake*

GENERAL POLICY CONDITIONS
I.

Policy Period
We are providing insurance under this policy beginning at 12:01 a.m. and ending at 12:01 a.m. during the
policy period shown on the policy Declarations.

II.

Premium
All premium charges under this policy will be computed according to our rules and rating plans which apply
at the inception of the current policy period. Premiums for this policy may be paid to us or our authorized
representative. The first premium is due on the Inception date of coverage.

III.

Separation of Insureds
This policy applies separately to each of you against whom claim is brought except with respect to:
A. the limits of liability; and
B. any of your duties as the first named on the Declarations.

IV.

Transfer of Interest
You must first obtain our written consent to transfer or assign this policy. If you die, the policy will continue
for the remaining part of the policy period; first, for the benefit of your legal representative while acting
within their duties as such, and second, for the benefit of anyone having proper temporary custody of your
property until a legal representative is appointed.

V.

Changes
Notice to any of our agents or knowledge possessed by any such agent or any other person shall not act
as a waiver or change in any part of this policy. It also will not prevent us from asserting any rights under
the provisions of this policy. None of the provisions of this policy will be waived, changed or modified
except by written endorsement Issued to form a part of this policy.

VI.

Your Duties in the Event of a Claim
If there is a claim or you reasonably think there will be, you must do the following:
A. notify us and your insurance agent in writing as soon as possible;
B. specify the names and addresses of the injured person(s) and any witnesses. Provide us with information on the time, place and nature of the event;
C. immediately forward all documents which you receive In connection with the claim to us;
D. fully cooperate with us or our designee in the making of settlements, the conduct of suits or other
proceedings, enforcing any right of contribution or indemnity against another who may be liable to
you because of injury or damage. You shall attend hearings and trials, assist in securing and giving
evidence, and obtaining the attendance of witnesses;
E. refuse, except at your own cost to voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or Incur any
expense other than reasonable medical expenses incurred at the time of an event.

VII. Transfer of Rights of Recovery
If you, or any entity for whom we make payment under this policy have rights to recover amounts from
another, those rights are transferred to us to the extent of our payment. You, or such other entity, must do
everything necessary to secure our rights and must do nothing after injury or damage to impair them.
VIII. Other Insurance
If other valid and collectible insurance Is available to you for a claim we cover under this policy, our obligations
are limited as follows:
Excess Insurance
This insurance is excess over any other insurance, self-insurance, self-Insured retention or similar programs,
whether primary, excess, contingent or on any other basis.
We will have no duty to defend any claim that any other insurer has a duty to defend. If no other insurer
defends, we will do so, but we will be entitled to your rights against all those other insurers.
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We will pay only our share of the amount of the loss, if any, that exceeds the sum of:
A. the total amount that all such other insurance would pay in absence of this Insurance; and
B. the total of all deductible and self-insured amounts under all such other insurance or other available
program.
This Insurance does not apply to other insurance that was bought by you specifically to apply m excess of
the Limits of Liability shown on the Declarations of this policy.
IX.

Overlap of Insurance
If more than one coverage or Coverage Part of this policy applies to the same or related claim, we will not,
for any reason, pay more than the limit of liability applicable to the most specifically described coverage.

X.

Legal Action Limitation
You may not bring any legal action against us concerning this policy until:
A. you have fully complied with all the provisions of this policy; and
B, the amount of your obligation to pay has been decided. Such amount can be set by judgment against
you after actual trial or by written agreement beween you, us and the claimant.
Any entity, or their legal representative, is entitled to recover under this policy after they have secured a
judgment or written agreement. Recovery is limited to the extent of the insurance afforded by this policy.
No entity has any right under this policy to include us in any action against you to determine your liability,
nor will we be brought into such an action by you or your representative. If you or your estate becomes
bankrupt or insolvent, it does not change any of our obligations under this policy.

XI.

Concealment, Misrepresentation, Fraud
This policy Is void in any case of fraud by you relating to it. It Is also void If you Intentionally conceal or
misrepresent a material fact or circumstance concerning:
A. this policy;
B. any covered property; or
C. your interest in the covered property or this insurance.

XII. NorvRenewal
We can non-renew this policy by giving written notice to the first of you named on the Declarations, at your
last known address, at least 30 days before the expiration date.
If notice is mailed, proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of notice.
XIII. Cancellation
This policy can be canceled by either the first of you named on the Declarations or us.
A. The first of you named can cancel this policy at any time. To do so, you must:
1.
return the policy to us or any of our authorized representatives; or
2.
mail a written notice to us, telling when the cancellation is to be effective.
We must receive the policy or written notice before the cancellation date.
B. We can cancel this policy by giving written notice to the first of you named on the Declarations, at
your last known address at least:
t,
10 days, if we cancel for non-payment of premium; or
2,
30 days, if we cancel for any other reason;
before the effective date of cancellation.
C. Notice of cancellation will state the effective date of cancellation. The policy will end on that date.
D. If we cancel, the refund will be pro-rata. If you cancel, the refund may be less than pro-rata. The
cancellation will be effective even If we have not made or offered a refund.
E. If notice is mailed, proof of mailing will be sufficient proof of notice.
XIV. Definitions
tf any of the following terms are used in this policy, they will only have the meaning as shown:
"Anti-trust law" means those laws listed in:
A. Title 15, Section 12, of the United States Code;
B. the Federal Trade Commission Act; and
C. any similar state law.
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"Asbestos" means the mineral in any form whether or not the asbestos was at any time:
A. airborne as a fiber, particle or dust;
B. contained in or formed a part of a product, structure or other real or personal property;
C. carried on clothing;
D. inhaled or ingested; or
E. transmitted by any other means.
"Auto" means a land motor vehicle, trailer or semi-trailer designed for use on public roads. Any attached
apparatus or machinery is included. Mobile equipment is not included. .
"Claim Expenses" means
A. fees charged by any attorney we designate; and
B, all other fees, costs, and expenses which result from the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal
of a claim.
These expenses must be incurred by us, or by you with our prior written consent.
"Claim Expenses" do not include:
A, salary charges of you or our regular employees or Company officials; or
B. fees and expenses of independent adjusters.
"Coverage Territory11 means:
A. the United States of America, including its territories and possessions;

B.

Puerto Rico; and

C. Canada.
"Damage" means:
A. physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that property; or
B. loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured.
"Hazardous Properties" includes radioactive, toxic or explosive properties.
"Hostile Fire" means one which becomes uncontrollable or breaks out from where it was intended to be.
"Injury" means bodily injury, sickness, disease, mental or emotional distress, sustained by a person. Also
included is death at any time as a result.
"Loading or unloading" means the handling of property:
A. after it is moved from the place where it is accepted for movement Into or onto an aircraft, watercraft
or auto;
B. while It is in or on an aircraft, watercraft or auto; or
C. while it is being moved from an aircraft, watercraft or auto to the place where it is finally delivered.
"Loading or unloading" does not mean the movement of property by means of a mechanical device, other
than a hand truck, that Is not attached to the aircraft, watercraft or auto.
"Mobile Equipment" means a land motor vehicle; whether or not self-propelled, that is not subject to any
motor vehicle registration and which is used primarily on your premises, or designed principally for use off
public roads or highways.
"Named Insured" means the entity named on the Declarations of this policy as the named insured.
"Nuclear Facility" means:
A. any nuclear reactor;
B. any equipment or device designed or used f o r
1.
separating the isotopes of uranium or plutonlum,
2.
processing or utilizing spent fuel, or
3*
handling, processing or packaging waste;
C. any equipment or device used for the processing, fabricating or alloying of special nuclear material if
at any time the total amount of such material In your custody at the premises where such equipment
or device Is located consists of or contains more than 25 grams of plutonium or uranium 233 or any
combination thereof, or more than 250 grams of uranium 235;
D. any structure, basin, excavation, premises or place prepared or used for the storage or disposal of
waste.
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Nuclear Facility also includes the site on which any of the foregoing is located, all operations conducted
on such site and all premises used for such operations.
'•Nuclear Reactor" means any apparatus designed or used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting
chain reaction or to contain a critical mass of fissionable material;
With respect to Injury to or destruction of property, the word injury or "destruction" includes ail forms of
radioactive contamination of property or loss of use.
"Pollutants11 means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor,
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste. Waste includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or
reclaimed.
"Pollution" means the actual, alleged or threatened discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or
escape of pollutants;
A. At or from any premises, site or location:
1.
which is or was at any time:
a.
owned, occupied, rented or loaned to you;
b.
used by or for any of you or others for the handling, storage, disposal, processing or treatment
of waste;
2> on which any of you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your
behalf are performing operations:
a.
if the pollutants are brought on or to the premises, site or location in connection with such
operations by you, any contractor or subcontractor; or
b.
if the operations are to test for, monitor, clean up, remove, contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize
or in any way respond to, or assess the effects of pollutants;
B. which are or were at any time transported, handled, stored, treated, disposed of, or processed as waste
by or for any of you or anyone for whom you may be legally responsible.
"Pollution" does not mean heat, smoke or fumes from a hostile fire.
"Source Material", "Special Nuclear Material", and "By-product Material" have the meanings given them in
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or any of its amendments.
"Spent fuel" means any fuel element or fuel component, solid or liquid, which has been used or exposed
to radiation in a "nuclear reactor".
"Waste" means any waste material:
A. containing by-product material other than the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its source material content; and
B. resulting from the operation by any entity of any nuclear facility included under the first two paragraphs
of the definition of nuclear facility.
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NURSES PROFESSIONAL LIABILIl 1
COVERAGE PART
We are the stock insurance company designated on the Declarations We agreee with you as follows:
I

COVERAGE AGREEMENTS
A. We will pay all amounts, up to our limit of liability, which you become legally obligated to pay as
a result of injury or damage caused by a medical incident by you or anyone for whose professional
acts or omissions you are legally responsible.
B. The medical incident as described above, must happen on or after the effective date and prior to
the end of the policy period stated on the Declarations.
C. We have the right and will defend any claim with an attorney of our choice. We will:
1.
do this even if any of the charges of the claim are groundless, false or fraudulent;
2.
investigate and settle any claim as we feel appropriate.
Our payment of the limit of liability ends our duty to defend or settle. We have no duty to defend
any claim not covered by this policy.

IL

EXCLUSIONS
We will not defend or pay under this Coverage Part for
A. any injury or damage arising out of any professional services provided by you prior to the effective
date of this policy;
B. any claim resulting from a medical Incident which rs also a willful violation of a statute, ordinance
or regulation imposing criminal penalties.
However, we will defend any civil suit against you seeking amounts which would be covered if
this exclusion did not apply.
In such case, we will only pay fees, costs and expenses of such defense;
C. any claim made against you, or any person whose acts or omissions you are legally responsible,
alleging any act of sexual intimacy, sexual molestation or sexual assault
However, we will defend any civil suit against you seeking amounts which would be covered if
this exclusion did not apply. In such case, we will only pay fees, costs and expenses of such
defense;
D. any of your actions or omissions:
1.
as a licensed or certified;
a.
nurse anesthetist, nurse-midwife or nurse practitioner,
b.
physician or surgeon assistant;
c.
emergency medical technician; or
d.
flight nurse;
2.
related to x-ray therapy;
3.
as a student nurse or nurse's aide who is not under the direct supervision of a physician,
nurse or other licensed medical professional or who is not employed at a hospital, nursing
home or other health care facility;
E. any liability you have as a proprietor, superintendent, director, administrative or executive officer
of any:
1.
hospital, nursing home or sanitarium;
2.
clinic, including those with bed and board facilities; or
3.
laboratory or business,
This exclusion does not apply to a medical incident arising out of the providing of professional
services by you or anyone acting under your direction or control;
R
any liability you assume under any contract or agreement.
This exclusion does not apply to a warranty of fitness or quality of any therapeutic agents or
supplies you have furnished or supplied in connection with treatment you have performed, or to
liability for Injury or damage that you would have In the absence of an employment contract or
agreement;
G. any claim by:
1.
an employee of yours arising out of and in the course of employment by you; or
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2,
the spouse, cmld, parent, brother, or sister of that employee as a consequence of 1. above;
This exclusion does not apply to any claim resulting from Immediate medical or surgical care
given to an employee after injury, and/or to a medical incident arising from your professional
services to an employee;
any amounts which you or any party must pay under any unemployment or workers' compensation,
disability benefits, or other similar law;
any punitive or exemplary amounts;
any fines, penalties, the return or withdrawal of fees or government payments imposed directly
upon you;
any multiplication of amounts payable under this policy, imposed by law;
any Injury or damage which was expected or intended by you.
This exclusion does not apply to any injury that results from the use of reasonable physical force
to protect any person(s) or property;
any claim arising out of actual or alleged involvement in any:
1.
anti-trust law violation; or
2.
agreement or conspiracy to restrain trade.
This exclusion does not apply to claim(s) arising from your activity as a member of any
committee, panel, or board which provides underwriting or claims(s) advice or recommendations on our behalf, provided your activity is within the scope of the committee's, panel's
or board's established guidelines;
any claims) caused by pollution regardless of cause;
any injury, or destruction;
1.
with respect to which you are also an insured under a Nuclear Energy Liability Policy Issued
by:
a.
Nuclear Energy Liability insurance Association;
b.
Mutual Atomic Energy Liability Underwriters; or
c.
Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada,
or would be an insured under any such policy if it had not terminated due to exhaustion of
its limits of liability; or
2.
resulting from the hazardous properties of nuclear material and with respect to which:
a.
any entity is required to maintain financial protection pursuant to the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 or any of its amendments, or
b. you are, or had this policy not been Issued would be, entitled to indemnity from the
United States of America or any of its agencies, under any agreement entered into by
the United States of America or any of its agencies with any entity;
3.
resulting from the hazardous properties of nuclear material if:
a.
the nuclear material:
i. is at any nuclear facility owned or operated by or on your behalf; or
ii. has been discharged or dispersed therefrom; or
Hi. is contained in spent fuel or waste at any time possessed, handled, used,
processed, stored, transported or disposed of by or on your behalf; or
b. the injury or destruction arises out of the furnishing by you of services, materials, parts
or equipment in connection with the planning, construction, maintenance, operation or
use of any nuclear facility.
If such facility Is within the United States of America, its territories, possessions or
Canada, this sub-paragraph 3.b. applies only to injury to or destruction of property at
such nuclear facility.
any claim for:
1.
any Injury, or damage arising out of the actual, alleged or threatened exposure at any time
to asbestos; or
2.
any los§, cost or expense that may be awarded or incurred:
a.
by reason of a claim or suit for any such Injury, damage; or
b. in complying with a governmental directive or request to test for, monitor, clean up,
remove, contain or dispose of asbestos.

Page 6

of 12

Q.
R.
S.

any liability resulting from owning, using, taking care of, loading or unloading or the entrustment
to others of any auto, mobile equipment, watercraft, or aircraft;
any liability resulting from an auto, mobile equipment, watercraft or aircraft which you own and
operate, or which Is operated for you by an employee in the course of their employment;
any claim arising out of any:
1.
refusal to employ;
2.
termination of employment;
3.
coercion, demotion, reassignment, defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination or
other employment related, practices, policies, acts or omissions; or
4.
actual or alleged discrimination by you;

LIMITS OF LIABILITY
A. Each Claim
The limit of liability stated for "each claim" is the limit of our liability for any claim or claims
arising out of, or in connection with, the same or related medical incident.
B.

C.
D.

Aggregate

Subject to provision A. above, the total limit of our liability for all claims shall not exceed the limit
of liability stated as "aggregate".
All medical Incidents for which claims are made during the policy period are included. The aggregate
limit of liability applies to each annual policy period.
The limits apply regardless of the number of persons or organizations who are covered under this
policy.
Claim expenses are in addition to, and not a part of the Limit of Liability.
We will also pay reasonable expenses you incur, including loss of income, as a result of being a
defendant or co-defendant in a civil suit resulting from a medical incident involving actual or
alleged injury or damage covered by this policy.
These amounts must result from your being required by us or the defense attorney to attend a
trial or proceeding of the suit or arbitration proceedings.
You must give us, or any of our authorized representatives written notice of the expenses incurred,
as soon as practicable, following the last date that such expenses were incurred.
This notice must contain sufficient information and detail to identify you, the time, place and
circumstances that resulted In these expenses. You must also identify the court and all parties
to the action before the court.
Our limit of liability for expenses incurred, including loss of income, resulting from your attendance
at one or more trials, proceedings or arbitration proceedings arising out of the same or actual or
alleged cause of action, shall be limited to the maximum amount stated on the Declarations as
per trial/proceeding, regardless of the number of days you are required to attend such trials or
proceedings.
Our obligation to pay such expenses Is further limited to the maximum amount stated on the
Declarations as per day, for any one day of attendance at such trials or proceedings.

ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS
"Claim" means the receipt by you of a demand for money or services naming you and alleging a
medical incident.

All claims arising out of the same medical incident will be considered as having been made at the time
the first claim was made.
"Injury", as defined in the General Policy Conditions section, shall also mean, with respect only to
your professional services, claims resulting from:
A. testimony given at or arising out of inquests;
B. malicious prosecution;
C. false arrest, detention, imprisonment, wrongful entry or eviction or other Invasion of the right of
private occupancy;
D. libel, slander or other disparaging materials;
E. a violation of an individual's right to privacy;
F.
assault, battery, mental anguish, mental shock or hallucination.
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"Medical Incident" means any act, error or omission in your providing or failure to provide professional
services. This includes your responsibility for anyone acting under your direction or control.
"Professional Services" means those services for which you are licensed, trained and qualified to
perform in your capacity as a:
A. registered or visiting nurse;
B. licensed practical or vocational nurse; or
C. student nurse or nurse's aide while under the direct supervision of a physician, nurse or other
licensed medical professional.
"Professional Services" also means your services as a member of a formal accreditation, standards
review, or similar professional board or committee related only to a professional nursing society
or a hospital.
''You" or "Your" means the individual named on the Declarations of this policy as the Named

Insured.
ADDITIONAL CONDITION
Policy Territory
This coverage applies to medical incidents taking place anywhere In the world. Claim and suit must be
made against you, however, in the Coverage Territory.

FIRST PARTY ASSAULT COVERAGE
We will pay, up to the maximum amount stated on the Declarations for "First Party Assault Coverage", for injury
to you or damage to your personal property caused by an assault by, or at the direction of another upon you.
Such assault must happen on your work premises, including the ways immediately adjoining such work premises,
or while you are away from such work premises conducting authorized work activity.
This coverage does not apply to damage to any mode of transportation used by you to go to and from your work
premises, or damage to any business or personal property owned, leased or rented by any other person or
business enterprise while in your possession.
This coverage applies as excess over any other available insurance covering such loss.
For the purpose of this coverage, "assault" means any willful attempt or threat to inflict Injury upon the person
of another, when coupled with an apparent present ability so to do, and any intentional display of force such as
would give the victim reason to fear or expect immediate bodily harm.
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PERSONAL LIABILITY
COVERAGE PART
We are the stock insurance company designated on the Declarations. We agree with you as follows:
I,

COVERAGE AGREEMENTS
A. We will pay all amounts, up to our limit of liability, which you become legally obligated to pay as
a result of Injury or damage covered by this policy. The Injury or damage must be caused by your
non-business activities.
B. We will pay all amounts for necessary medical expenses Incurred, or medically ascertained within
three (3) years from the date of an accident, resulting in the injury. The injury must be to a
person(s)and happen:
1.
at your insured location and such person(s) must be present at such location with your
permission;
2.
off the Insured location premises if the injury:
a*
arises out of a condition at the insured location or immediately adjoining approaches;
or
b.
is caused by;
i. your non-business activities;
II. a residence employee in the course of their duties as such; or
iii. an animal which you own or which is in your care or custody.
The injured person(s), or someone acting on their behalf must:
1.
give us written proof of claim, under oath if required, as soon as practicable; and
2.
execute authorization to allow us to obtain copies of all medical documents relating to such
injury.
The injured person(s) shall submit to physical examination by a physician selected by us when,
and as often as we may reasonably require.
Any payment made under this provision does not constitute an admission of any guilt or liability
by either you or us.
C. Payments For Which You Are Not Legally Liable:
1.
First Aid To Others:
We will pay all medical related expenses for which you have voluntarily made payment or
incur, up to a maximum of $500, for first aid being rendered to others as a result of any injury
covered by this policy.
The first aid must be provided with a 48 hour period after the injury happens. This provision
does not apply to any person as defined as you in this policy.
2.
Damage To Property Of Others:
We will pay up to a maximum of $250 for any one incident for damage to the property of
others that is caused by you. We will not pay for damage to the property of others if such
damage:
a.
is caused intentionally by any person defined as you under this policy who has reached
the age of majority in your state;
b.
is caused by any tenant, or any other person not qualifying for coverage under the
definition of you in this policy, who Is residing in your residence premises.
c.
arises out of:
i. any business pursuit;
ii. any act or omission with regard to any premises, other than your residence
premises, which you own, rent or control;
iii. your owning, using, taking care of, or entrustment to others of an auto, mobile
equipment, waste or aircraft.
Within 60 days from the date of loss, you must submit a sworn statement of such loss to
us. You must also exhibit the damaged property if such property Is In your possession and/
or control.
D. The injury or damage as described above, must happen on or after the effective date and prior to

Page 9

of 12

E.

the
We
1.
2.

end of the policy period stated on the Declarations.
have the right and will defend any claim. We will:
do this even if any of the charges of the claim are groundless, false or fraudulent;
investigate and settle any claim as we feel appropriate.

EXCLUSIONS
We will not defend or pay under this Coverage Part for:
A. any injury or damage which was expected or intended by you.
This exclusion does not apply to any Injury that results from the use of reasonable physical force
to protect any person(s) or property;
B. any damage to property;
1,
you own, rent, occupy or use; or
2.
which is in your care, custody or control;
C. any injury or damage caused by or resulting from your business pursuits, or the rental or holding
for rental for any part of any premises by you.
This exclusion does not apply to:
1.
any activity which is ordinarily incidental to non-business pursuits; or
2.
the rental of or holding for rental of your residence premises:
a.
on an occasional basis for the exclusive use as a residence;
b.
in part, unless intended for use as a residence by more than 2 roomers or boarders;
c.
in part, as an office, school, studio or private garage;
D. medical expenses for any person while on your premises because business pursuits are conducted
or any professional services are rendered on such premises;
E. any injury or damage arising out of an auto, mobile equipment water or aircraft which;
1.
you own, take care of, operate, load or unload, lease or rent, or entrust to others;
2.
is loaned to you or is operated, loaded or unloaded for you or on your behalf by an employee
in the course of their employment by you.
This exclusion does not apply to your watercraft if;
1.
it is stored at an insured location;
2.
it Is owned by or rented to you and:
a.
Is an Inboard or in board-outdrive with motor power of less than 50 horsepower; or
b.
Is a sailing vessel with or without auxiliary power, and less than 26 feet in overall length;
3.
you own, or report to us in writing within 45 days after the acquisition of a watercraft, powered
by one or more outboard motors with less than 25 total horsepower;
F.
injury to any of your employees arising out of:
1.
any premises owned or rented to you for which is not an insured location; or
2.
their employment by you.
This exclusion does not apply to:
1,
any residence employees, If the injury results from their residence employment; or
2.
a claim resulting from immediate care given to an employee after the injury;
G. any amounts which you or any party must pay under any unemployment or workers' compensation,
disability benefits, or other similar law;
H. any liability you assume under any contract or agreement,
I.
any injury or damage caused by or resulting from:
1.
war, either directly or indirectly, including undeclared and civil war,
2.
Insurrection, rebellion or revolution;
3.
warlike acts by a military force or personnel;
4.
destruction or seizure of property for a military purpose; or
5.
nuclear reaction, radiation or contamination, regardless of cause.
LIMITS OF LIABILITY
A. Each Incident
The limit of liability stated for "each Incident" is the limit of our liability for all injury or damage
arising out of, or in connection with, the same or related Incident. This limit applies regardless of
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B.

2.

IV.

the number of you covered by, or claims made under this policy.
Medical Expenses
1.
Each Person:
Our total limit of liability for all medical expenses payable for any one person who sustains
injury as a result of a single incident, shall not exceed the amount stated on the Declarations
as "Each Person".
Aggregate:
Our total limit of liability for all medical expenses payable for all persons who sustain injury as a
result of a single Incident, shall not exceed the amount stated on the Declarations as Aggregate".
This limit applies regardless of the number of you covered by, or claims made under this policy.

ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS
"Business" means a trade, profession or occupation,
"Claim" means the receipt by you of a demand for money or services naming you and alleging injury
or damage.
"Incident" means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which:
A. results in injury and/or damage; and
B. was not expected nor intended by you.
Injury and damage arising from exposure to substantially the same general conditions shall be considered as one Incident
"Insured Location" means:
A. your residence premises;
B. that part of any other premises, structures and grounds:
1.
used by you as a residence and which is shown on the Declarations; or
2,
which Is acquired by you during the policy period for your use as a residence;
C. any premises used by you in connection with the premises included in A. and B. above;
D. any part of a premises not owned by you but where you are temporarily residing;
E. vacant land owned by or rented to you other than farm land;
F
land owned by or rented to you on which a one or two family dwelling is being constructed as a
residence for you;
G. individual or family cemetery plots or burial vaults of yours; and
H. any part of a premises occasionally rented to you for other than business purposes.
"Residence Employee" means an employee of yours who performs duties:
A. in connection with the maintenance or use of the residence premises, Including household or
domestic services; or
B. elsewhere of a similar nature not in connection with your business.
"Residence Premises" means:
A. the one to four family dwelling, other structures and grounds; or
B. that part of any other building where you reside and which Is shown as the residence premises
on the Declarations.
"You" or "Your" means:
A. the named Insured shown on the Declarations;
B. the following residents of your household, as respects non-business activities:
1.
your relatives;
2.
any other person, under the age of 21, who is In your care or the care of your relatives;
C. with respect to animals or watercraft to which this policy applies:
1.
any entity legally responsible for such animals or watercraft:
a.
which are owned by you; or
b. owned by your relatives or someone in your care:
2.
this does not include any entity using such watercraft or having custody of such animals in
the course of any business, or without permission of the owner; and
D. with respect to any auto or mobile equipment to which this policy applies, any person engaged in
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your employment or the employment of any person Included as an insured under this definition.
V.

AMENDED DEFINITION
For the purpose of this Coverage Part, the terms auto and mobile equipment when used in Section ll.T
Exclusions does not apply to:
A. a motorized land vehicle in dead storage at an insured location;
B. any watercraft, trailer, camper trailer or utility type trailer not being towed by or carried on a motor
vehicle; or
C. any motorized golf cart, while being used for golfing purposes.

VI.

AMENDED/ADDITIONAL CONDITIONS
A, General Condition VII., Transfer of Rights of Recovery Is replaced in its entirety by the following:
Transfer of Rights of Recovery
If you, or any entity for whom we make payment under this policy has rights to recover amounts
from another, those rights are transferred to us to the extent of our payment. You, or such other
entity, must do everything necessary to secure our rights and must do nothing after injury or
damage to impair them.
With respect to nonbusiness liability, you may waive all rights of recovery against any person.
However, such waiver must be provided in writing prior to any loss. If these rights are not waived,
we may require an assignment of rights of recovery for a loss, to the extent that payment Is made
by us,
If an assignment is sought by us, you must sign and deliver all related documents to us and
cooperate with us in any reasonable manner.
This right to recover does not apply to any medical expenses coverage, or any damage to property
for which you are not legally liable.

B.

Policy Territory
This coverage applies to Injury and/or damage which happens, and for which claim is first made
against you, within the Coverage Territory.

XL/, w- ChMfecL^cA^

\cj U4.

Chairman of the Board

Secretary
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ADDENDUM F
Letter from American Casualty to University, dated July 17,1997

Sen Diego Service Office
P.O. Box 87334
San Diego, CaBfomia 92138-7334
Fax Number (619} 296-7663

CNA HealthPro
July 17, 1997
Mr. David G. Williams
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000

Re:

Our Insured
Our Claim No.
Claimant
D/Occurrence
Issuing Co.

Troy Alan Broyka
HM-004840-TI
Abel Hepworth(deceased)

4/14/97
American Casualty Company of Reading, PA

Dear Mr. Williams:
This will confirm your letter of June 11, 1997 in which you invite our participation in the settlement
of the case brought by the family of Abel Hepworth.
Pursuant to your request, I am enclosing a copy of Mr. Broka's policy. I would appreciate it if you
would send a copy of the University's liability policy.
Under the terms of Mr. Broka's policy with American Casualty Company, we would be considered
an excess carrier at best. The General Policy Conditions state in part:
"VIII. OTHER INSURANCE
If other valid and collectible insurance is available to you for a claim we cover under this
policy, our obligations are limited as follows:
Excess Insurance
This insurance is excess over any other insurance, self-insurance, self-insured retention
or similiar programs, whether primary, excess, contingent or on any other basis.
We will have no duty to defend any claim that any other insurer has a duty to defend. If
no other insurer defends, we will do so, but we will be entitiled to your rights against all
those other insurers.

HM-004832-TI

-2-

July 17, 1997

We will pay only our share of the amount of the loss, if any, that exceeds the sum of:
A. the total amount that all other such other insurance would pay in absence of this
insurance,
B. the total of all deductible and self-insured amounts under all such other insurance
and other available programs."
In addition to the language cited above, Mr. Broka is an employee of the University of Utah Health
Sciences Center and as such should be defended under their policy. We respectfully decline to
participate in the settlement of this matter. If you have any questions regarding this letter, please
do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

Deborah C. Ellis
Claims Specialist
(619)682-3512

ADDENDUM G
Affidavit of Nurse Troy Alan Broka

' •'"*"'r

Jaryl L . R e n c h e r # 4 9 0 3

EPPERSON & RENCHER, PC
10 West 100 South, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 983-9800
Alec Barinholtz (Pro Hac Vice)
Jennifer Mathis (Pro Hac Vice)
ROSS, DIXON & BELL, L.L.P.
5 Park Plaza, Suite 1200
Irvine, California 92614-8529
Telephone: (949) 622-2700
Attorneys for Defendant American Casualty Company of Reading, PA

THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF
READING, PA

)
;)
)
])
)
])
;

ST. PAUL FERE AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

» Case No. 98091315^0
\
]
;) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
]
]

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
Plaintiffs,
v.

v.

•

]

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF
READING, PA, and TROY ALAN
BROKA,
Defendants.

)
]
]
]

AFFIDAVIT OF TROY ALAN
BROKA IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT AMERICAN
CASUALTY COMPANY OF
READING, PA'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Itf

I, TROY ALAN BROKA, after being duly cautioned and sworn, state as follows:
1.

If called to testify in this matter, I could and would testify competently to the

following facts, which are within my personal knowledge.
2.

From January 1, 1997 until the end of April, 1997,1 was employed by the

University of Utah Hospital (the "Hospital") as a registered nurse. I worked in the neural
intensive care unit at the Hospital and signed a contract with the University after completing
a brief one to two day orientation at the Hospital.
3.

I was employed by the Hospital at the time I provided nursing care for Abel

Hepworth at the Hospital in April 1997.
4.

I have never received by certified mail or in any other fashion any kind of

notice that the Hepworths intended to commence a malpractice action against rne or pursue
any other claim against me. It was my understanding that the Hepworth's claim was against
the University and that the Hepworths were not pursuing me directly.
5.

I never was told by either the University or anyone representing its insurer

St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company that either intended to sue me in connection
with the Hepworth's claim against the University.
6.

I never made a demand for defense or indemnity on American Casualty nor

did I ever seek coverage under the American Casualty Policy in connection with the
Hepworth matter.
7.

I personally never incurred any defense expenses in connection v/ith the

Hepworth matter, nor, to my knowledge, did I incur any other obligations to pay any
amounts in connection with the settlement of the Hepworth matter.

-1-

DATED this

jM

day of February, 2002.

(Xh^^sJ)^.
Troy Alan Broka, R.N.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

)
:SS

1
I
COUNTY OF lryst\g^ v i

}

)

On this j l } f ^ day of February, 2002, personally appeared before me Troy Alan
Broka, R.N., who being first duly sworn up his oath states that he has read the foregoing,
knows the contents thereof and believes the same to be true of his own personal knowledge
and as to those matters stated upon his knowledge, believes them to be true.

HV\OAAJL

&f)(

NOTARY PUBLIC, residing in
MARIE COX
Notary Public, Ingham County, M l —
My Commission Expires 02/24/2006

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the _£_ day of FewWy,:2002 I caused to be delivered by the method
indicated below, a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF TROY
ALAN BROKA IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF
READING, PA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following:

yC

XT

VIA FACSIMILE
VTA HAND DELIVERY
VIA U.S. MAIL
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Terry Rooney
Julianne P. Blanch
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Plaintiff U of U Hospital and U of U
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5000

VTA FACSIMILE
VIA HAND DELIVERY
VIA U.S. MAIL
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Bret Gardner
CROWTHER & GARDNER
Attorneys for Plaintiff St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Company
1121 East 3900 South, Building C, #200
Salt Lake City, UT 84124
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ADDENDUM H
District Court's October 7,2002 Memorandum Decision and December 30,2002
Order granting summary judgment in American Casualty's favor

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
CONTINENTAL CASUALTY dba CNA
INSURANCE COMPANIES, an
Illinois corporation,

Case No.980913150
Hon. GLENN K. IWASAKI

Defendant.
Court Clerk: Janet Banks
October 4, 2002
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF
READING, PA and TROY ALAN
BROKA,
Defendants.
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and American Casualty Company of
Reading, PA's Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Lynn
Faldmo.

The Court heard oral argument with respect to the motions

on September 6, 2002.

Following the hearing, the Court granted the

parties time for additional briefing.

UNIVERSITY v. AMERICAN

The

Court

having

Page 2

received

the

MEMORANDUM DECISION

additional

briefing

and

considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits attached thereto and
for the good cause shown hereby enters the following ruling.
Addressing first the Motion to Strike, after reviewing the
Affidavit and Supplemental Affidavit of Ms. Faldmo, the Court is
persuaded it is subject to appropriate exceptions to the hearsay
rule

and, further,

any deficiencies

knowledge have been cured.

with

regard

to personal

Accordingly, the motion is denied.

Turning next to the Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, the
plaintiffs, University of Utah and University of Utah Hospital
(collectively "the University") settled a claim brought by a widow,
Susan Hepworth, whose husband died, allegedly due to a nurse's
negligence. The University secured an agreement from Mrs. Hepworth
releasing

it and its agents and employees

from all liability

connected with the patient's death and paid $1 million of its own
money to help settle the lawsuit.1
With this Complaint, the University seeks subrogation and
contribution.'
this

Court

Specifically, the University seeks a ruling form

that

American

Casualty

Company

of

Reading,

PA

("American") is the primary insurance policy covering the nurse,

'The University's lawsuit was consolidated with a lawsuit
brought by St. Paul Fire &. Marine Insurance Company against
American.
St. Paul also seeks reimbursement for monies it
contributed to the settlement.

UNIVERSITY v. AMERICAN

Troy Alan Broka
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("Nurse Broka"), and that American is, therefore,

primarily responsible for covering Nurse Broka, and, consequently,
must

reimburse

the

University

for

monies

paid

toward

the

settlement. 2
With their motion for summary judgment, the University asks
this

Court

Broka's

to Rule

primary

insurance

University, American
policy

issued

to

as a matter

law

carrier.3

asserts

Nurse

of

Specifically,

the other

Broka

makes

University's self-insurance program.4

that American

insurance

the

policy

is

Nurse

notes

the

clause

in

the

excess

to

the

This is nonsensical, asserts

the University, as Nurse Broka did not have his own self-insurance
program and although the University has a self-insurance program,
the

clause

does

not

state

that

it

extends

to

"self-insurance

2

The University is self-insured for professional liability
claims up to $1 million-when there is not insurance available to
cover the particular claim.
J

A determination of amount is not sought.

4

Section VII OTHER INSURANCE provides:
If other valid and collectible insurance is
available to you for a claim we cover under
this policy, our obligations are limited as
follows:
Excess Insurance
This insurance is excess
over any other
insurance,
self-insurance,
self-insured
retention
or
similar
programs,
whether
primary, excess,
contingent or on any other
basis.

UNIVERSITY v. AMERICAN

programs of others."
reviewed
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Indeed, argues the University, it never

the policy and never agreed

to act as Nurse Broka's

primary liability insurance.
Next, the University asserts American's

interpretation of

"other insurance" is overboard and renders the policy worthless as
hospitals have risk allocation systems in place, whether through
self-insurance programs or insurance policies and under American's
view of the clause, it would never need to pay a claim against one
of its insureds because the hospital that employed the nurse will
always be self-insured or have its own insurance coverage.
Moreover, it is the University's position that even if the
"other insurance" clause is interpreted as American urges, the
clause runs counter to public policy requiring an insurer to cover
an insured when it bargained for the risk and received premium
payments.

Finally, contends the University, Utah courts will not

enforce an insurance clause that serves to deprive the insured of
coverage when the clause could not easily be found by the insured.
American opposes the motion and brings its own motion for
summary judgment arguing the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and
controlling Utah case law, together, preclude Nurse Broka from
incurring any personal liability for the underlying wrongful death
matter and further prohibit the University or its insurer from
seeking indemnification from the University's employees or their

UNIVERSITY v. AMERICAN

employees'

insurers
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in such
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circumstances.5

Moreover,

argues

American, it only insured Nurse Broka, who never had any monetary
demands directly asserted against him by the underlying claimants.6
Specifically, American notes that according to plaintiffs'
complaint in this action, Nurse Broka negligently administered
excess

intravenous fluids to Mr. Hepworth, allegedly causing or

contributing

to Mr. Hepworth's death four days later.

It is

American's position, however, that plaintiffs have not alleged
Nurse Broka was acting outside the course and scope of his duties
in connection with those acts.

Further, argues American, there

were several other employees at the University who were potentially
responsible for any excess administration of fluids or surrounding
events.
The University opposes American's cross motion arguing the
Governmental Immunity Act does not bar the University's claims for
subrogation
University

and
notes

equitable

subrogation.

Specifically,

Utah

Ann.

states

Code

§63-30-38

that

the
if a

-""Indeed, asserts American, allowing the University or St. Paul
to recover from Nurse Broka's insurer, when they are barred by
statute from recovering from Nurse Broka, would abrogate the
purpose of the Governmental Immunity Act.
6

With respect to St. Paul, American contends it insured the
University and all of its employees and the settlement was designed
to cover every employee of the University who was involved in
providing care to Mr. Hepworth. In sum, it is American's position
St. Paul did no more than protect its own interests and those of
its insureds by it's participation in the Hepworth settlement.

UNIVERSITY v. AMERICAN

governmental

entity
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settles a claim against an employee, "the

employee" may not be required

to indemnify the entity.

This

section, argues the University, does not say that the employee's
private insurer does not need to indemnify the entity.

Similarly,

asserts the University, Utah Code Ann. §63-30-33(1) (c) states that
a governmental entity's "insurer" has no right of indemnification
or contribution

from the employee.

While the legislature was

careful to protect employees from indemnifying their employer, it
is

the

University's

position

they

did

not

draft

a provision

preventing the governmental employer from seeking indemnification
from the employee's insurer.

Additionally, with respect to the

cases cited by American, the University notes that none address the
situation where insurer was a self-insured governmental body.
Furthermore,

argues

the

University,

if

American's

interpretation of the Act were correct, the policy it provided to
Nurse Broka would be worthless.

Indeed, contends the University,

American maintains that under the Act the University would be
solely

responsible

for

losses

occasioned

by

its

insured's

negligence and that its policy would never be triggered because
Nurse Broka supposedly would never be "legally obligated to pay"
due to his employer's duty to indemnify him.

According to the

University, when American was initially invited to participate in
the Hepworth settlement, they refused solely on the basis of the

UNIVERSITY v. AMERICAN
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"other insurance" exclusion in the policy.
the

University,

Governmental

American

Immunity

Act

waived

any

Consequently, argues

right

as an excuse

of

to

assert

its obligation

the
to

contribute.
Finally, the University contends it does not matter that Mrs.
Hepworth did not demand

the money directly

from Nurse Broka.

Specifically, the University notes that its subrogation claim is
against American, not Nurse Broka, and American was on notice from
the outset that a third party was pursuing a claim arising from its
insured's negligence.7
St. Paul joins in the University's opposition and argues in
addition that because both it and American insured Nurse Broka for
the same risk, St. Paul is entitled to equitable contribution from
American for its portion of the loss paid by St. Paul to the
Hepworths.

Indeed,

notes

St. Paul,

its

claim

for

equitable

contribution

(not subrogation) is not precluded by any argument

that American stands in the shoes of Broka, because St. Paul is not
required to stand in the shoes of the Hospital with respect to
Broka's defense and, thus, becomes subject to the defense.
right of equitable contribution

7

is not derivative

The

and is not

It is the University's position American's duty does not
depend upon Nurse Broka's receipt of a demand for money. Indeed,
notes the University, the policy defines "claim" as "receipt by you
of a demand for money or services naming you and alleging a medical
incident."

UNIVERSITY v. AMERICAN
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dependant upon any rights against indemnity the Broka may have
under the Act.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if no genuine issue of
material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

"In considering a

summary judgment motion, the Court must evaluate all the evidence
and all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in the
light most

favorable to the party opposing

summary judgment."

Cinder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 739 P.2d 634, 634 (Utah Ct. App.
1987).
Applying the aforementioned to the facts of this case, it is
important to note the University essentially concedes that the
Hepworths made no "claim" within the meaning of the American policy
against Nurse Broka.

This is critical as the American's policy is

only triggered by a "claim" or an insured's legal obligation to pay
some amount.

In other words, Nurse Broka never had any claims made

against him and never became legally obligated to pay anything to
the Hepworths in connection with the University's and. St. Paul's
settlement

of

the

University's

liability

to

the

Hepworths.

Accordingly, none of American's obligations under the policy it
issued to Nurse Broka ever matured.

Consequently, American is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
With

respect

to

St.

Paul,

there

can

be

no

claim

for

UNIVERSITY v. AMERICAN
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insurers

unless
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one

insurer

was

equally

obligated to provide coverage to the same insurer for the same
risk, yet failed to do so.

Here the obligations triggered by the

Hepworths' demands were those of the University and its insurer,
St. Paul, for amounts in excess of the University's retained limit.
The

Hepworth's

made

no demand

that would

have

the

forgoing,

American's

Motion

triggered

the

American policy.
Based

upon

Judgment is granted.

for

Summary

Consequently, the University's motion is,

respectfully, denied.8
DATED this

8

(

day of October, 2002.

In light of the forgoing ruling, the Court does not reach the
issue of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, nor the constitutional
issues surrounding the Act.

CASE NO 980913150

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on thellthdav of OCTOBER. 2002,1 mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing order, postage prepaid thereon, to the following:

JARYL L. RENCHER
10 WEST 100 SOUTH #500
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
ALEC BARINHOLTZ
JENNIFER MATHIS
5 PARK PLAZA, SUITE 1200
IRVINE, CA 92614-8529
TERRY ROONEY
JULIANNE P BLANCH
PO BOX 45000
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84145-5000
BRET GARDNER
1121 EAST 3900 SOUTH BLDG C #200
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84124

DISTRICT COURT CLERK
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DEPUTY CLERK
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Jaryl L. Rencher #4903
EPPERSON & RENCHER, PC
10 West 100 South, #500
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Telephone: (801) 983-9800
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Alec Barinholtz (pro fjac Vice)
Jennifer Mathis (pro Hac Vice)
ROSS, DIXON & BELL, L.L.P.
5 Park Plaza, Suite 1200
Irvine, California 92614-8529
Telephone: (949) 622-2700
Attorneys for Defendant American Casualty Company of Reading, PA

THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH HOSPITAL and
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,
Plaintiffs,
v.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT ON
PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF
READING, PA

Case Nor9S091-3-r59G
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Minnesota
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF
READING, PA, and TROY ALAN
BROKA,
Defendants.

819836 v2

Plaintiffs University of Utah and University of Utah Hospital's Motion for Summary
Judgment (in which plaintiff St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company joined), defendant
American Casualty Company of Reading PA's Motion for Summary Judgment, and American
Casualty's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Lynn Faldmo came on for hearing before the Court
on September 6, 2002. Following the hearing, St. Paul and American Casualty submitted
supplemental briefing.
Having heard oral argument and having read and considered all papers and supporting
documents submitted in connection with the parties' motions, the Court issued a memorandum
decision dated and signed October 7, 2002, wherein the Court granted American Casualty's
Motion for Summary Judgment, denied the University's Motion for Summary Judgment and
denied American Casualty's Motion to Strike.
For the reasons set forth in the Court's October 7, 2002 memorandum decision, IT IS
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT JUDGMENT BE ENTERED
FORTHWITH in favor of defendant American Casualty Company of Reading, PA and against
plaintiffs the University of Utah and University Hospital and St. Paul Fire and Miarine Insurance
Company and that plaintiffs' lawsuit against American Casualty be dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this

7 ^

day of

h

The Honorable GlennKT
Third Judicial District Court Judge

ADDENDUM I
Court of Appeals' July 21,2003 order dismissing plaintiff St. Paul's appeal

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

JUL 2 1 2003
Paulette Stagg
Cferk of the Court

University of Utah Hospital
and University of Utah,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Case No. 20030070-CA
American Casualty Company of
Reading, PA,
Defendant and Appellee.

Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne.
This matter is before the Court upon the Appellant, St. Paul
Fire & Marine Insurance Companys', stipulation for withdrawal of
appeal, filed July 15, 2003, pursuant to Rule 37, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
Now therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal as to
St. Paul Marine Insurance Company, is dismissed.
Dated th is

£^f

FOR THE COURT:

day of July, 2003.

Dated this

Q\

day of July, 2003

By r i i ^ O u Ln,§Juuyia
Lisa Collins
Deputy Clerk
Case No.: 20030070-CA
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, #980913150

